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“[P]olitical speech does not lose First Amendment protection ‘simply
because its source is a corporation.’”
1

- Justice Kennedy, for the 5-4 majority in Citizens United

“[C]orporations have no consciences, no beliefs, no feelings, no thoughts,
no desires. . . . [T]hey are not themselves members of ‘We the People’ by
whom and for whom our Constitution was established.”

- Justice Stevens, dissenting in Citizens United

2

ABSTRACT
This Article advances a new framework for analyzing whether and when regulation of
corporations is warranted. This new framework springs from a contractarian perspective. Using
that perspective, ordinarily the constituents of a corporation should be allowed the autonomy to
structure their bargains involving the corporation in whatever way they see fit, absent government
regulation. However, where the resulting bargains involved are plagued by some defects, either
procedural or substantive, then ex ante regulation is not only constitutional but is also prudent.
This Article uses a critique of the now famous Citizens United case to illustrate and develop this
framework. The justification for regulation is even more compelling where the absence of
regulation creates some systemic risk to our economy or democracy that would not easily be cured by
ex post judicial involvement.
In Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, a 5-4 majority overturned a
congressional enactment limiting corporate electioneering. Decided in 2010, the Citizens United
opinion has been harshly criticized by a broad spectrum of people, ranging from President Obama
to Ben & Jerry. A group of senators has even called for a constitutional amendment to undo the
results of that decision. In this Article, I criticize the majority opinion in Citizens United for
ignoring the prevailing contractarian view of a corporation. In so doing, the majority arrived at
the false conclusion that corporations should be entitled to the constitutional protections of
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individual citizens.
Under the contractarian paradigm, corporations are understood as a nexus of contracts among the
corporation’s constituents. Contractarians typically draw the normative conclusion that since
parties freely enter into those contracts, parties should be at liberty to set whatever terms they like,
without government regulation.
My Article argues for the opposite normative conclusion, that because the contracts at stake in fact
are often not bargained for freely or fairly, as the theoreticians argue, there is need for government
regulation to ensure the contracting process and the resulting bargains are fair. This need for
regulation is all the more compelling in a case like Citizens United where the very nature of our
democratic process is at stake.
This reconceived contractarian paradigm should empower both judicial and legislative bodies to
appropriately regulate and even limit the activities of corporations. It is my hope that this Article
might encourage jurists and legislators to do just that.
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INTRODUCTION
As the quotes above illustrate, a battle is raging in the Supreme Court.
At its core, this battle is about the proper role of corporations in our
3
economy and in our democracy. This Article will present a new analytical
framework that suggests that, where the bargains involving the constituents
of a corporation are not fairly or freely entered into, ex ante regulation is
not only constitutional, it is also prudent.
The most recent catalyst that renewed this battle over whether and when
to regulate corporations was Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission,
4
decided in January 2010. That case has quickly become a landmark case on
an issue that is at the crossroads of three distinct doctrinal areas of law:
contract, corporate, and constitutional law.
In Citizens United, a 5-4 majority overturned a congressional enactment
that placed specific limits on a corporation’s ability to use corporate money
5
to advocate for or against politicians during election seasons. According to
the Citizens United majority, the political campaign context is an area where
corporations are entitled to the same First Amendment protection as natural
6
persons.
Thus, the majority struck down what it deemed an
unconstitutional restraint on corporate First Amendment free speech
7
rights.
In this Article, I criticize the majority opinion in Citizens United for
8
ignoring the prevailing contractarian view of a corporation. As a result of

3
4
5
6
7
8

In his dissent, Justice Stevens described the majority opinion as threatening “to
undermine the integrity of elected institutions across the Nation.” Id. at 931.
Id. at 876 (majority opinion).
Id. at 917.
Id. at 904–08 (proclaiming that a corporation’s and an individual’s political speech are
equally “indispensable” to democratic principles).
Id. at 903, 907.
Professor Stefan Padfield disagrees with the view that the Justices ignored the
contractarian paradigm. Instead, he has reasoned that even though the Citizens United
majority did not acknowledge corporate law scholarship in its opinion, it seemed to have
impliedly adopted a view of the corporation as an aggregate of its constituent citizens.
Stefan J. Padfield, The Dodd-Frank Corporation: More Than a Nexus-of-Contracts, 114 W. VA. L.
REV. 209, 224 (2011) [hereinafter Padfield, The Dodd-Frank Corporation] (“The [Citizens

768

JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

[Vol. 15:3

the Court’s approach, the majority arrived at the false conclusion that
corporations should be entitled to the constitutional protections of
individual citizens.
This Article presents a new way of using the
contractarian paradigm as a defense of corporation regulation.
Under the contractarian paradigm, corporations are understood as a
nexus of contracts among the corporation’s constituents. Contractarians
typically draw the normative conclusion that since parties freely enter into
those contracts, parties should be at liberty to set whatever terms they like,
without government regulation.
My Article argues the opposite normative conclusion: that where the
resulting bargains involved are plagued by some defects, either procedural
or substantive, then ex ante regulation is not only constitutional, but is also
prudent. The justification for regulation is even more compelling in cases
like Citizens United where the absence of regulation creates some systemic
risk to our economy or democracy that would not easily be cured by ex post
judicial involvement.
As a nexus of contracts, corporations are entirely distinct from
individuals. Thus, granting them the protections an individual receives
under the Constitution is mistaken.
Part One of this Article will discuss the Citizens United decision itself.
This Part will highlight the majority’s defense of raising a corporation up as
an equal to an individual for free speech purposes (at least in the election
law context). It will also outline the dissent’s arguments that the majority
has turned the Constitution on its head by taking on a constitutional issue
not presented by the parties and establishing new precedent that further
frees corporations from government regulation.
Part Two of this Article will discuss two of the dominant paradigms for
understanding a corporation discussed in corporate law scholarship.
However, this Part will focus on the prevailing economic perspective to

United] majority viewed the corporation as fundamentally little more than an association
of citizens.”). Professor Padfield equates this “association of citizens” view of a
corporation with the contractarian nexus of contracts paradigm, and he explains that an
explicit adoption of the nexus of contracts paradigm would have allowed the majority to
“conclude that there was nothing about the corporation qua corporation that justified
restricting corporate political speech solely on the basis of corporate identity.” Stefan J.
Padfield, Citizens United and the Nexus-of-Contracts Presumption, 1 HARV. BUS. L. REV.
ONLINE 25, 26 (2011), available at http://www.hblr.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/01/
Padfield_Online_Article.pdf [hereinafter Padfield, Citizens United and the Nexus-ofContracts Presumption]; see also Jonathan A. Marcantel, The Corporation as a “Real”
Constitutional Person, 11 U.C. DAVIS BUS. L.J. 221, 222 & n.7, 265 (concluding that the
Citizens United majority’s treatment of corporations is an implicit adoption of “real entity”
theory, which “posits that the corporation, as an entity, is entitled to constitutional
protection independent of its shareholders,” and arguing that such a theory does not
accord with the original intentions of the drafters of the Constitution).
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further develop my contractarian’s defense of corporation regulation. In
this Part, I will explain why the contractarian paradigm of the corporation as
a nexus of contracts is the most helpful paradigm available and why, in
accord with that theory, corporations should still be subject to regulation.
This theoretical discussion will develop this contractarian paradigm as an
analytical tool for assessing whether and when regulation of corporations is
both constitutional and prudential. It will also apply that analytical
framework to the Citizens United case itself.
Part Three will discuss some of the responses that have been proposed to
remediate the Citizens United decision. It will assess those responses using
the contractarian framework developed in Part Two. It will ultimately
recommend further advocacy of a corporation’s appropriately regulated
place in both our economy and our democracy.

I.

PART ONE: THE CITIZENS UNITED DECISION

The catalyst for the battle over a corporation’s appropriate role in our
nation’s political system was the Citizens United decision. Much has been
9
written about Citizens United, and the opinion itself spans more than one
10
hundred pages, including the concurrences and dissents. This Article will
present a thorough analysis of this case from the perspective of how the
Supreme Court views a corporation, with a specific focus on whether and
when a corporation should be subject to regulation.
This Part will (A) put that decision into its political context, before (B)
briefly presenting an overview of the facts of the case. This Part will then
examine (C) why the Court insisted on deciding whether the statute in
question was constitutional even though the litigants did not ask the Court
to do so; and (D) the central substantive issue of whether the fiction of
corporate personhood should have been extended to empower corporations
with the same free speech rights as individual persons.

A. The Political Context
The venue for the battle over a corporation’s appropriate role in our
nation’s political system is not limited to the Supreme Court. Indeed, each
of our three branches of government has spoken on the issue of what role

9

10

See, e.g., Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Citizens United and the Corporate Form, 2010 WIS. L. REV. 999
(2010); Elizabeth R. Sheyn, The Humanization of the Corporate Entity: Changing Views of
Corporate Criminal Liability in the Wake of Citizens United, 65 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1 (2010);
Michael R. Siebecker, A New Discourse Theory of the Firm After Citizens United, 79 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 161 (2010).
Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 876.
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corporations should play in politics and, at least at the moment, the Court is
at odds both with the other two branches, and with itself.
11
Congress, our legislative branch, was the first to speak on the issue.
Relying on decades of similar legislation and precedent that reacted to that
legislation, Congress carefully crafted and enacted the restricting regulation:
12
the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (“BCRA”). The impetus for
the enactment was Congress’s finding that corporations can create a
distorting effect in the political process due to their ability to accumulate
massive amounts of wealth and their duty to zealously advocate single13
mindedly for the wealth maximization of their shareholders.
And Congress has been no stranger to corporate regulation action over
the years. Historically, the most massive corporate regulatory effort was the
overarching statutory framework established by the Securities and Exchange
14
15
Act of 1933 and the Exchange Act of 1934. Both of those acts implicate
the First Amendment because they involve forced speech in the form of
16
disclosure requirements for corporations. The most recent congressional

11

12
13

14
15
16

Congress has wrestled for centuries with the question of how to eliminate corruption,
including the appearance of corruption, in elections. The fear is that supporters of
candidates are later rewarded with special access to the politician, jobs, contracts, or
other favors. See, e.g., Louis Lawrence Boyle, Reforming Civil Service Reform: Should the
Federal Government Continue to Regulate State and Local Government Employees?, 7 J.L. & POL.
243, 246–54 (1991) (summarizing congressional efforts beginning in 1791 to reform
participation by civil servants in electoral politics, as a result of concern about perceived
corruption in the political system). Congress has regularly spoken on these matters. See,
e.g., infra notes 145–49.
Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, 2 U.S.C. § 431 (2006).
There was some debate over whether the law would effectively eliminate all corporate
“soft money” influence on elections, but generally corporate campaign finance was
understood to be a problem. Cf. H.R. REP. NO. 107-131, pt. 1, at 48 (2001) (“There
simply is too much special-interest money from too few sources flowing into party
committees in the form of soft money, and onto the airwaves in the form of thinly
disguised political advertisements paid for with unrestricted dollars from entities that are
permitted, under today’s broken campaign finance regime, to disclose as much or as little
about their operations as they choose. Many of these entities are barred by the Federal
Election Campaign Act (FECA) from raising and spending any money to influence
federal campaigns. Increased reliance on soft money shows no signs of abating, and is of
particular concern.”); see also Trevor Potter, McConnell v. FEC Jurisprudence and Its Future
Impact on Campaign Finance, 60 U. MIAMI L. REV. 185, 185–86 (2006) (explaining that the
BCRA was intended primarily to both eliminate soft money donations, “i.e. donations not
in compliance with amount limits, source prohibitions, and reporting requirements,” and
also to prohibit corporations from financing electioneering communications from
corporate treasury funds).
The Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77 (2006).
The Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78 (2006).
See Michael R. Siebecker, Corporate Speech, Securities Regulation, and an Institutional Approach
to the First Amendment, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 613, 641–45 (2006) (observing that “[t]he
securities regulation regime currently inhabits an island of immunity from the First
Amendment”).
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attempts to regulate modern abuses of the corporate form are the Sarbanes17
18
Oxley Act in 2002, and the Dodd-Frank Act in 2010.
The Supreme Court responded to Congress in its majority opinion in the
19
Citizens United case.
The majority struck down the campaign finance
regulation on the basis that corporations are people and should receive the
same First Amendment protections on their freedom of speech as natural
20
people. The Court spoke aggressively about speech being an “essential
17

18

19

20

Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15
and 18 U.S.C.). For a comprehensive early analysis of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the
opportunities missed by that legislation, see Joseph F. Morrissey, Catching the Culprits: Is
Sarbanes-Oxley Enough?, 2003 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 801 (2003) (assessing the likely impact
of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act on the anti-fraud rules of the U.S. securities market shortly
after it was signed into law and proposing ways the judiciary and legislature could
improve and/or correct the Act’s deficiencies); see also Roberta Romano, The SarbanesOxley Act and the Making of Quack Corporate Governance, 114 YALE L.J. 1521, 1602 (2005)
(examining the corporate governance mandates of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and
concluding the Act was “seriously misconceived”); Sanjai Bhagat, Brian Bolton & Roberta
Romano, The Promise and Peril of Corporate Governance Indices, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1803,
1862 (2008) (analyzing corporate governance indices and finding that a flexible
regulatory regime is more desirable than the Sarbanes-Oxley Act’s “one-size-fits-all”
approach).
12 U.S.C. § 5301 (Supp. 2012). For an assessment of proposed regulatory solutions to
recent corporate misconduct, see Daniel J. Morrissey, After the Meltdown, 45 TULSA L. REV.
393 (2010) (discussing the insufficiencies of the regulatory reforms proposed in the wake
of the recent financial crisis, and offering suggestions for how they may be strengthened);
Usha Rodrigues, Corporate Governance in an Age of Separation of Ownership from Ownership, 95
MINN. L. REV. 1822, 1866 (2011) (“Regulatory responses to the bailout have fallen back
on familiar tools like shareholder empowerment, disclosure, and independence, with no
acknowledgement that the investing landscape has changed in ways that make traditional
regulatory approaches unlikely to advance underlying regulatory aims.”); Nicola Faith
Sharpe, The Cosmetic Independence of Corporate Boards, 34 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1435 (2011)
(arguing that the regulatory reforms aimed at improving the monitoring of corporate
boards amount to nothing more than “cosmetic independence”); see also Padfield, The
Dodd-Frank Corporation, supra note 8 (arguing that Dodd-Frank creates problems for
adherents of contractarianism both from a positive perspective, because it is a reminder
that the state retains the power to dictate terms vis-à-vis the corporation regardless of how
much the state may have chosen to advance freedom of contract previously, and from a
normative perspective, because it officially announces the arrival of the too-big-to-fail
corporation, which at least some contractarians would previously have argued should not
arise in de-regulated competitive markets).
Interestingly, some state regulatory initiatives have been upheld by federal courts after
Citizens United. See Ciara Torres-Spelliscy, Has the Tide Turned in Favor of Disclosure?
Revealing Money in Politics After Citizens United and Doe v. Reed, 27 GA. ST. U. L. REV.
1057, 1084–89 (2011) (describing state campaign disclosure laws that have been upheld
by courts in the wake of Citizens United).
Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 130 S. Ct. 876, 904–08 (2010) (rejecting the
antidistortion rationale that was developed by the Court in Austin, and holding instead
that Congress is prohibited by the First Amendment from limiting the political speech of
associations of people that happen to “ha[ve] taken on the corporate form” (citing
Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652 (1990), overruled by Citizens United,
130 S. Ct. at 913)).
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21

It facilitates citizens’ paramount right “to
mechanism of democracy.”
22
inquire, to hear, to speak, and to use information.” The Court was clear
that those rights extend not only to natural citizens, but also to corporations,
23
entities whose speech is “a precondition to enlightened self-government.”
But even the Citizens United Court was split, with five Justices in the majority
24
and four Justices proffering a scathing dissent.
After Congress and the Supreme Court spoke to the issue, the President
of the United States added his voice. In a press release issued by the White
House on the day the decision was released, the President stated,
With its ruling today, the Supreme Court has given a green light to a new
stampede of special interest money in our politics. It is a major victory
for big oil, Wall Street banks, health insurance companies and the other
25
powerful interests that . . . drown out the voices of everyday Americans.

Perhaps speaking from his background as a constitutional law professor
at the University of Chicago, President Obama went on in his State of the
Union address that followed the release of that opinion to criticize the
Court’s decision as unjustifiably reversing one hundred years of established

21
22

23

24

25

Id. at 898 (“Speech is an essential mechanism of democracy, for it is the means to hold
officials accountable to the people.”).
Id. (“The right of citizens to inquire, to hear, to speak, and to use information to reach
consensus is a precondition of enlightened self-government and a necessary means to
protect it.”).
Id. (“[The BCRA’s] prohibition on corporate independent expenditures is thus a ban on
speech. . . . [This] is a precondition to enlightened self-government, and a necessary
means to protect it.”).
As has all too often been the case in recent years, the First Amendment aspects of the
Court’s opinion were split along partisan lines: conservative Justices were in the majority
(Justices Alito, Kennedy, Roberts, Scalia, and Thomas) leaving the liberal Justices
outnumbered (Justices Breyer, Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and Stevens). Dean Erwin
Chemerinsky has recently written an article discussing this troubling trend of partisan
Supreme Court decisions. See Erwin Chemerinsky, The Roberts Court and Freedom of Speech,
63 FED. COMM. L.J. 579, 581–82 (2011) (“[Y]ou can understand the Roberts Court better
by reading the 2008 Republican platform than by reading the Federalist Papers,
and . . . that is certainly true with regard to freedom of speech.”); see also Gene Nichol,
Citizens United and the Roberts Court’s War on Democracy, 27 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 1007, 1009
(2011) (criticizing the Roberts Court’s judicial activism—including its practices of
bringing up matters or scheduling re-argument on its own, as well as overruling
significant precedents—with a particular aim at Chief Justice Roberts because of the
“grotesque hypocrisy” of the promise he made during his confirmation hearing to “just
call balls and strikes” (quoting Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of John G. Roberts, Jr.
to be Chief Justice of the United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong.
56 (2005) (statement of John Roberts, nominee, C.J. of the U.S. Supreme Court))).
Press Release, White House Office of the Press Sec’y, Statement from the President on
Today’s
Supreme
Court
Decision
(Jan.
21,
2010),
available
at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/statement-president-todays-supreme-courtdecision-0.
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precedent regulating corporate involvement in campaign finance and
26
“open[ing] the floodgates for special interests.”
And the Supreme Court—at least one member—seemed to speak out
again. As one of six Supreme Court Justices sitting in the House of
Representatives listening to President Obama’s State of the Union
chastisement, Justice Alito was visibly shaking his head in disagreement with
27
the President’s Citizens United assessment. Justice Alito went so far as to
28
mouth the words, “not true.”
Justice Alito was, of course, part of the
majority.
But perhaps more important than what any particular branch of the
government says, the people who are responsible for electing our
government representatives have spoken on the issue. First, as seen with the
29
Tea Party’s unexpected rise during the 2010 midterm elections, the people
began demanding more accountability and transparency; not just from
government, but also from the corporations and banks bailed out by the
30
government. The Occupy Wall Street movement stands apart from the Tea
31
Party Movement, and it has swept through cities around the country.
26

27

28
29

30

31

Barack H. Obama, President of the United States, Address Before a Joint Session of the
Congress on the State of the Union (Jan. 27, 2010), at 8 (“With all due deference to
separation of powers, last week, the Supreme Court reversed a century of law that I
believe will open the floodgates for special interests, including foreign corporations, to
spend without limit in our elections.”).
See Alito Reacts to Obama Remarks, ABC NEWS VIDEO (Jan. 27, 2010),
http://abcnews.go.com/video/playerIndex?id=9682842 (“Justice Alito shakes his head
when Obama hits campaign finance decision.”).
Id.
There is some debate over the significance of the Tea Party in the 2010 mid-term
elections; it had more success in the House elections than the Senate elections. See
generally
Tea
Party
Movement,
Times
Topics,
N.Y.
TIMES,
http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/
timestopics/subjects/t/tea_party_movement/index.html?8qa (last updated Oct. 4, 2012)
(“The Tea Party became a pivotal player in the Republicans’ successful bid to take control
of the House of Representatives in the 2010 midterm elections. . . . [However,] the
numbers of Tea Party-affiliated winners in the November 2010 elections was [sic]
relatively small . . . .”).
See generally Credit Crisis—Bailout Plan (TARP), Times Topics, N.Y. TIMES,
http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/subjects/c/credit_crisis/bailout_
plan/index.html (last updated Dec. 7, 2010) (“The Troubled Asset Relief Program,
known as TARP and more familiarly as ‘the bank bailout’ was hastily put in place in
September 2008 as stock markets plunged, credit markets around the globe seized up
and the world seemed on the verge of a cataclysmic financial meltdown. Congress
authorized the Treasury Department to use up to $700 billion to stabilize financial
markets through the program—a step that inspired widespread public outrage, helping
to fuel what became the Tea Party Movement, and, in the mind of most economists, one
that played a crucial role in pulling the global economy back from the brink.”).
Many commentators question the ultimate message and motives of the Occupy Wall
Street movement, pointing out its lack of demands and leaders. These questions have not
been completely settled. See, e.g., Arthur S. Brisbane, Who Is Occupy Wall Street?, N.Y.
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While there are no particular individuals leading the Occupy Wall Street
32
movement, the movement’s central message is clear. Among other issues,
that message condemns corporate domination of elections and the
manipulation of the political and economic system by the economic elite in
33
the United States.
And Congress seems to be listening to the masses, as some members
have responded directly to the Supreme Court’s decision in Citizens United.
On November 1, 2011, Senator Tom Udall, together with a group of seven
United States Senators, introduced a proposed constitutional amendment to
34
effectively reverse Citizens United. That proposed amendment would clarify
that Congress and state legislatures are empowered to regulate campaign
finance. In Senator Udall’s words, “Citizens United has unleashed a flood of
special interest money . . . . [T]he Courts have taken this [campaign finance
35
area] over, we [in Congress] have to take it back.”

B. The Factual Context
The regulation at stake in Citizens United is the Bipartisan Campaign
36
Reform Act of 2002 (“BCRA”).
That Act amended previous election
finance regulations to prohibit corporations from spending any of their

32
33

34

35
36

TIMES, Nov. 13, 2011, at 12, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/13/opinion/
sunday/who-is-occupy-wall-street.html (grappling with the difficulty of reporting on “a
movement that pointedly eschews leadership and formal demands,” and hypothesizing
that a “push to establish origins and leadership would help surface the demands, or at
least the most important underlying issues” of the Occupy Wall Street movement).
Id. (“[S]ome members say the [Occupy Wall Street] groups are ‘leaderless.’” (quoting
Jerry Ceppos, journalism dean at Louisiana State University)).
See Edith Honan & Edward McAllister, Thousands protest banks, corporate greed in U.S.
marches, REUTERS (Oct. 15, 2011, 7:51 PM), available at http://www.reuters.com/article/
2011/10/15/us-usa-wallstreet-protests-idUSTRE79A41E20111015
(describing
the
protesters’ anger that U.S. banks are “enjoying booming profits after getting bailouts in
2008, while many people are struggling in a difficult economy”); see also Occupy Movement
(Occupy Wall Street), Times Topics, N.Y. TIMES, http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/
timestopics/organizations/o/occupy_wall_street/index.html (last updated Sept. 17,
2012) (describing the original impetus for the Occupy Wall Street as making “a stand
against corporate greed, social inequality and the corrosive power of major banks and
multinational corporations over the democratic process”).
See The Dylan Ratigan Show (MSNBC television broadcast Nov. 3, 2011), available at
http://video.msnbc.msn.com/dylan-ratigan-show/45155424#45155424
(interviewing
Senator Udall, who asserted that “we need a constitutional amendment so that Congress
can take back the authority to legislate on campaign finance reform” and need to
recreate a “marketplace of ideas”).
Id.
Specifically, the section of the BCRA at issue in Citizens United was § 203, which amended
§ 441b of Title 2 United States Code. Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 § 203,
2 U.S.C. § 441b (2006), invalidated by Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 130 S. Ct.
876, 913, 917 (2010).
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treasury funds on electioneering communications, and also to impose
certain disclosure and reporting requirements for permitted electioneering
37
communications. The term “electioneering communications” is defined by
federal statute and regulation as: “any broadcast, cable, or satellite
communication that refers to a clearly identified candidate for Federal
Office and is made within 30 days of a primary or 60 days of a general
38
election” and that is “publicly distributed.”
In December 2007, Citizens United, a nonprofit corporation, sought to
distribute a documentary film entitled Hillary: The Movie, assessing the
39
candidacy of then-presidential candidate Hillary Clinton. The distribution
would have occurred within thirty days of the 2008 primary elections for
40
President and was thus arguably precluded by the BCRA. Citizens United
brought suit against the Federal Election Commission (“FEC”) in an attempt
to get declaratory and injunctive relief, claiming that the BCRA’s application
41
to Hillary: The Movie was unconstitutional.
Citizens United claimed that the movie was just a documentary and
42
therefore should not be deemed electioneering in any way. The courts
disagreed and cited several passages from the movie: the narrator begins
the movie asking, “could [Hillary Clinton] become the first female president
43
in the history of the United States?”; the movie goes on to describe her as
44
“Machiavellian”; and it closes by warning the audience about what is at
stake in the next election for President and that the decision should not be
45
taken lightly.
The District Court ruled in favor of the FEC, finding that the statute
clearly applied to the movie and thus precluded Citizens United from airing

37
38
39
40
41
42

43
44
45

See 2 U.S.C. § 441b(b)(2), (c)(1)–(5) (2006), invalidated by Citizens United v. Fed.
Election Comm’n, 130 S. Ct. 876, 913, 917 (2010).
Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 887 (quoting 2 U.S.C. § 434(f)(3)(A) (2006); 11 C.F.R.
§ 100.29(a)(2) (2009)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 887.
Id.
Id. at 888.
Specifically, Citizens United had proffered the ironic argument that Hillary: The Movie
did not express advocacy for or against a specific candidate. Citizens United v. Fed.
Election Comm’n, 530 F. Supp. 2d 274, 278–79 (D.D.C. 2008).
Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 890.
Id.
Id. (“Finally, before America decides on our next president, voters should need no
reminders of . . . what’s at stake . . . .” (alteration in original).
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46

the movie within the prescribed period. The Supreme Court took the case
47
on appeal.
The Supreme Court did not just rule that the statute was
unconstitutional as applied to Hillary: The Movie; it went further by also
48
ruling that the statute was unconstitutional altogether. According to the
majority opinion, the statute placed unique limits on a corporation’s ability
to use corporate money to advocate for or against politicians during election
49
seasons. Thus, the Court held, the enactment placed an unconstitutional
50
restraint on the corporation’s First Amendment right to free speech.
Under this reasoning, corporations are entitled to the same First
Amendment protection in this area as are natural persons.

C. The Need to Address Broad Constitutional Issues
The first issue discussed by the majority was whether it even needed to
51
evaluate a facial challenge to the constitutionality of the statute. In his
dissent, Justice Stevens could not have exhibited more anger about the
majority taking on that question. Justice Stevens pointed out that Citizens
United itself had dropped its facial challenge to the constitutionality of the
52
statute and had pressed only an “as-applied” challenge. The litigating party
sought only a limited ruling that the statute did not apply to it, so that it

46

47
48

49

50

51

52

See Citizens United, 530 F. Supp. 2d at 281–82 (holding that plaintiff Citizens United had
not established the required probability of prevailing on the merits of its claims in order
to warrant injunctive or declaratory relief).
Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 887; see also Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 129 S.
Ct. 594 (2008) (noting probable jurisdiction over the Citizens United appeal).
Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 913 (holding that the provisions of the BCRA barring
independent corporate expenditures for electioneering communications violated the
First Amendment).
See id. at 898 (explaining that, by restricting the amount of money a corporation can
spend on political communication during a campaign, the BCRA reduces the quantity
and depth of corporate expression, as well as reducing the size of the audience reached).
See id. at 898–99 (holding that the BCRA’s “prohibition on corporate independent
expenditures is thus a ban on speech,” and that that there is “no basis for the proposition
that, in the context of political speech, the Government may impose restrictions on
certain disfavored speakers,” i.e. corporations).
See id. at 892, 892–96 (determining that “the Court cannot resolve this case on a narrower
ground without chilling political speech” and defending this determination by explaining
that “it is not judicial restraint to accept an unsound, narrow argument just so the Court
can avoid another argument with broader implications”).
Id. at 931–32 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (arguing that the
question of whether the BCRA was facially unconstitutional “was not properly brought
before [the Court]” because the appellant Citizens United “never sought a declaration
that [BCRA] § 203 was facially unconstitutional as to all corporations and unions”); see
also id. at 892 (majority opinion) (“Citizens United stipulated to dismissing count 5 of its
complaint, which raised a facial challenge to [2 U.S.C.] § 441b . . . .”).
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53

Justice Stevens emphasized that it was
could distribute its film.
extraordinary for the Supreme Court to take on questions that are not
54
brought by the litigants themselves.
55
Moreover, “facial challenges are disfavored” in order to preserve as
56
much of the legislature’s work as possible.
In Justice Stevens’s words,
“[e]ssentially, five Justices were unhappy with the limited nature of the case
before us, so they changed the case to give themselves an opportunity to
57
change the law.” This statement stands in stark contradistinction to the
majority’s invocation of Chief Justice John Marshall’s instructions that it is
58
the Court’s duty “to say what the law is,” but not to create it. In his dissent,
Justice Stevens cited another cardinal principle of the judicial process: “[i]f
59
it is not necessary to decide more, it is necessary not to decide more.” In
other words, the Supreme Court should not extend the reach of its opinions
beyond what is absolutely necessary.
Further, Justice Stevens argued that the majority’s approach flouted the
maxim of judicial restraint, the notion that the judiciary should attempt to
construe a statute as consonant with the Constitution to the extent possible
60
and reach a facial constitutional challenge only when it absolutely must.
53

54

55

56

57
58

59
60

Id. at 931–32 (characterizing appellant Citizens United’s claim as only that its film should
not be subject to the BCRA “because [appellant’s speech] was ‘funded overwhelmingly by
individuals’” (quoting Brief for Appellant at 29, Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. 876 (Jan. 8,
2008) (No. 08-205))).
Id. at 932 (“It is only in exceptional cases coming here from the federal courts that
questions not pressed or passed upon below are reviewed.” (quoting Youakim v. Miller,
425 U.S. 231, 234 (1976)) (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also id. at 931 (“In
declaring § 203 of BCRA facially unconstitutional . . . the majority decides this case on a
basis relinquished below, not included in the questions presented to us by the litigants,
and argued here only in response to the Court’s invitation. This procedure is unusual
and inadvisable for a court.”).
Id. at 932 (“This Court has repeatedly emphasized in recent years that ‘[f]acial challenges
are disfavored.’” (alteration in original) (quoting Wash. State Grange v. Wash. State
Republican Party, 552 U.S. 442, 450 (2008))).
Id. at 932 (articulating the “normal rule” as favoring partial invalidation rather than facial
invalidation, so that a statute is declared invalid only “to the extent that it reaches too far,
but [is] otherwise left intact” (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Brockett v.
Spokane Arcades, Inc., 472 U.S. 491, 504 (1985))).
Id.
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803). Oddly, the Citizens United majority cited this
same passage from Marbury to justify departing from precedent. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct.
at 913 (2010) (majority opinion) (arguing that legislatures cannot prevent the Court
from overruling its own precedents, because such an ability would allow Congress to
interfere with the Court’s duty to “say what the law is”). Justice Stevens described the
majority’s Marbury citation as “perplexing.” Id. at 934 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part); see also infra notes 69 and 82.
Id. at 937 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing PDK Labs., Inc. v.
U.S. Drug Enforcement Admin., 362 F.3d 786, 799 (D.C. Cir. 2004)).
See id. at 933 (“[C]ourts should neither anticipate a question of constitutional law in
advance of the necessity of deciding it nor formulate a rule of constitutional law broader
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“The Court operates with a sledge hammer rather than a scalpel when it
strikes down one of Congress’ most significant efforts to regulate the role
61
that corporations and unions play in electoral politics.”
The majority took Justice Stevens’s criticism to heart and addressed it
directly. After rejecting possible arguments that the BCRA would not apply
to Citizens United’s film, the Court decided that it must reach the larger
62
constitutional question. If the Court did not, the resulting prohibition of
films such as Hillary: The Movie would untenably chill political speech.
Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority, stated: “It is not judicial restraint
to accept an unsound, narrow argument just so the Court can avoid another
63
argument with broader implications.”
Moreover, Justice Kennedy explained that even though Citizens United
had dropped its facial challenge to the constitutionality of the BCRA, the
challenge had been raised—and rejected—at the federal district court level
64
and therefore could be reconsidered on appeal. Additionally, the Court
explained that since the appellant Citizens United was making a First
Amendment argument, any theories to support that argument could be
65
entertained. The Court emphasized that attempting to deal with only the
as-applied question would require future courts to determine standards for
66
the BCRA’s application that would be both difficult and uncertain. Finally,
the Court stressed that the speech interest at stake was so crucial to the
democratic process that a full review of the regulation was warranted and
67
indeed necessary.

61
62
63
64

65

66

67

than is required by the precise facts to which it is to be applied.” (internal quotation
marks omitted) (quoting Wash. State Grange, 552 U.S. at 450)).
Id.
See id. at 892 (majority opinion) (asserting that resolving the case on a “narrower ground”
would chill political speech).
Id.
Id. at 892–93 (explaining that “even if a party could somehow waive a facial challenge
while preserving an as-applied challenge, that would not prevent the Court
from . . . addressing the facial validity [of the statute at issue],” as long as the issue was not
presented below because the lower court passed on that issue, and concluding that the
ruling by the District Court in Citizens United presented such a case).
Id. at 893 (noting that “throughout the litigation, Citizens United has asserted a claim
that the FEC has violated its First Amendment right to free speech” and that “‘[o]nce a
federal claim is properly presented, a party can make any argument in support of that
claim; parties are not limited to the precise arguments they made below’” (alteration in
original) (quoting Lebron v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., 513 U.S. 374, 379 (1995))).
Id. at 894–95 (describing the “uncertainty caused by the litigating position of the
Government” and concluding that because “the Government holds out the possibility of
ruling for Citizens United on a narrow ground yet refrains from adopting that position,
the added uncertainty demonstrates the necessity to address the question of statutory
validity”).
Id. at 895–96 (highlighting the “primary importance of speech itself to the integrity of the
election process” as a reason that the “ongoing chill upon speech that is beyond all doubt
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The majority of the Court went so far as to invoke Marbury v. Madison
and echo the famous words penned there: that it is the Court’s duty “to say
68
what the law is.” Justice Stevens, in his dissent, retorted that the Court does
not normally flout what its predecessors have said the law is, nor does it
“typically say what the law is not as a hedge against future judicial error”
(referring to the Court’s decision to rule the statute unconstitutional only in
order to avoid the difficulty that future courts might have in applying the
69
statute).
Thus, despite the strenuous objections of Justice Stevens on behalf of
four of the Justices and the canons of constitutional interpretation
mentioned above, including the maxim of judicial restraint, the majority
went to great lengths to make sure it took on the larger facial question of the
constitutionality of the statute. The majority seems to have been intent on
taking this opportunity to further empower corporations.

D. Whether Corporations Have the Free Speech Rights of Individuals
In light of the facial challenge to the constitutionality of the BCRA, the
core issue of the Citizens United opinion became whether corporations have
the same free speech rights as individuals, specifically in the context of
70
electioneering. If so, the BCRA could not withstand constitutional scrutiny
71
under the First Amendment. The Justices on both sides of the answer to
this question used a wide range of constitutional interpretive tools to justify
their conclusions. Embedded in their discussions were implicit notions
72
about the very nature of a corporation. Chief among the interpretive tools
employed in the debate between the majority and dissenting opinions are:
(i) original intent; (ii) respect for the principle of stare decisis; and (iii) the
balancing of interests.

68
69
70

71

72

protected” in the case at hand requires a return “to the earlier precedents that a statute
which chills speech can and must be invalidated where its facial invalidity has been
demonstrated”).
Id. at 913 (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803)).
Id. at 934 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); see also id. at 895–96
(majority opinion).
Id. (providing context by describing the strong protection of free speech in general, and
then enumerating the variety and breadth of corporate speech prohibited by the BCRA
in the electioneering context).
Id. at 898 (“If [2 U.S.C.] § 441b applied to individuals, no one would believe that it is
merely a time, place, or manner restriction on speech. Its purpose and effect are to
silence entities whose voices the Government deems to be suspect.”).
This is abundantly clear from some of the attacks on Justice Stevens’s dissent. See, e.g., id.
at 925 (Scalia, J., concurring) (“Despite the corporation-hating quotations the dissent has
dredged up, it is far from clear that by the end of the 18th century corporations were
despised. If so, how came there to be so many of them?”).
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1. With No Evidence, the Majority Finds Original Intent Was to Empower
Corporations
Justice Kennedy wrote the opinion of the majority, and began his
opinion by saying that providing corporations with free speech rights simply
73
reflects “ancient First Amendment principles.” Justice Kennedy went on to
describe the BCRA as an outright ban on corporate political speech, a classic
74
example of censorship, which does indeed violate the First Amendment.
Justice Kennedy, speaking for the Court, made many impassioned
statements about the necessity of political speech to a free society:
“[P]olitical speech must prevail against laws that would suppress it, whether
75
by design or inadvertence.” However, the Court did acknowledge that laws
that burden political speech are permissible if they pass a strict scrutiny test,
i.e. if the government can prove that the regulation “furthers a compelling
76
interest and is narrowly tailored to achieve that interest.” Of course, as is
further developed in Part I.D.3 below, the majority never did find such a
77
compelling interest.
Justice Stevens, writing on behalf of the dissenting Justices, was outraged
by this glib invocation of our Founding Fathers and resulting manipulation
78
of First Amendment jurisprudence.
Justice Stevens discussed at great
length his view that the Founding Fathers never would have extended
79
individual rights to a corporation. Justice Stevens also noted that the entire

73

74

75
76
77
78

79

Id. at 886 (majority opinion) (distinguishing the majority’s handling of the BCRA’s
limitations on corporate speech from the treatment in Austin, which the majority
described as “a significant departure from ancient First Amendment principles” (quoting
Fed. Election Comm’n v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449, 490 (2007) (Scalia, J.,
concurring) [hereinafter WRTL]) (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also id. at 906
(arguing that, although the Framers “may not have anticipated modern business and
media corporations,” there is nevertheless “no support for the view that the First
Amendment, as originally understood, would permit the suppression of political speech
by media corporations”).
Id. at 888–89 (considering whether the case could be resolved on narrower, as-applied,
grounds, and concluding that, in light of the severity of 2 U.S.C. § 441b’s limitations on
political speech, the challenge to the statute must be evaluated on a facial
constitutionality basis).
Id. at 898.
Id. (quoting WRTL, 551 U.S. at 464) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. at 903–13 (rejecting a series of rationales proffered as compelling interests,
concluding that none of these were sufficient to pass strict scrutiny).
Id. at 948–51 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“The Court invokes
‘ancient First Amendment principles’ and original understandings to defend today’s
ruling, yet it makes only a perfunctory attempt to ground its analysis in the principles or
understandings of those who drafted and ratified the Amendment.” (internal citations
omitted)).
Id. at 949–51 (“Unlike our colleagues, [the Framers] had little trouble distinguishing
corporations from human beings, and when they constitutionalized the right to free
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Bill of Rights was designed to protect individual rights (the rights of natural
people). In his words, there is not a “scintilla of evidence to support the
notion that anyone believed” corporations should be given the free speech
80
rights of individuals.
Justice Stevens discussed what the Founding Fathers would have
81
understood about corporations: at the end of the eighteenth century there
were only a few hundred corporations in the entire country, and each
needed to specifically petition its local state governments for a charter that
82
would entitle it to do anything at all. Since these corporations were very
much at the mercy of the state for all of their rights, the notion today that
corporations should not be subject to congressional regulation would be
83
absurd to men like Thomas Jefferson.
In Justice Stevens’s words, this
notion is not merely a misinterpretation of the Constitution in a close case,
84
but is absolutely “implausible.”
Here and throughout the dissent, the dissenting Justices’ ire is apparent.
There is no hint of a healthy and respectful debate on close issues of
constitutional interpretation. Justice Stevens clearly seemed to believe the
majority was manipulating the case instrumentally to achieve the partisan deregulatory results desired.
Justice Stevens went on to explain that, in fact, corporations were feared
85
in the early days of our nation. Justice Stevens cited scholars from the era
of our Constitution’s founding, writing repeatedly that corporations were
86
“soulless” and could “concentrate the worst urges of whole groups of men.”
In an early case from 1819, then Chief Justice Marshall (ironically cited by
87
the majority for his Marbury opinion) wrote that, “[a] corporation is an

80

81
82
83
84
85

86

87

speech in the First Amendment, it was the free speech of individual Americans that they
had in mind.”).
Id. at 948 (arguing that there is no support for the claim that the same First Amendment
protections afforded to individuals would also insulate corporations from laws enacting
regulatory distinctions based solely on the corporate form).
Id. at 948–51 (citing numerous secondary sources describing the treatment and
understanding of corporations in the time of the Founders).
Id. at 949, 949 & n.53.
See id. at 949 n.54 (quoting one of Thomas Jefferson’s letters, which describes his
apprehensions about the ultimate consequences of the rise of corporations).
Id. at 950.
Id. at 949 (noting that “widespread acceptance of business corporations as socially useful
actors” was not the case in the Founding era, and instead “did not emerge until the
1800’s [sic]” (citing Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, Essay, The End of History for
Corporate Law, 89 GEO. L.J. 439, 440 (2001))).
Id. at 949 (“The word ‘soulless’ constantly recurs in [Founding-era] debates over
corporations . . . . Corporations, it was feared, could concentrate the worst urges of whole
groups of men.” (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting
LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 194 (2d ed. 1985))).
Id. at 913 (majority opinion) (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803)).
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artificial being, invisible, intangible, and existing only in contemplation of
law. Being the mere creature of law, it possesses only those properties which
88
the charter of its creation confers upon it.”
Scholarship and jurisprudence up to this day evidence the historic
89
distrust of corporations described by Justice Stevens in his dissent. As will
be developed further in Part II of this Article, Justice Stevens was describing
the Founding Fathers’ understanding of the corporation, which today is
90
known as the state entity theory. In accord with that theory, a corporation
is not entitled to any constitutional protections; it is granted rights and
91
privileges by the state that created and empowered it. Accordingly, it can
also be regulated and limited by the state.
Modern corporate scholars continue to emphasize this view of the
92
corporation.
In a recent article, Professor Hillary Sale argues that it is
essential to conceive of a corporation as a public entity, as distinct from a
93
private entity, or, for that matter, a private individual.

88
89

90

91

92

93

Trs. of Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. 518, 636 (1819).
See, e.g., Marcantel, supra note 8, at 229, 265 (reasoning that the majority in Citizens United
must have viewed a corporation in accordance with a “real entity” theory that views a
corporation as a natural person, and going on to argue that the drafters of the
Constitution did not share this corporate theory, and that they would not have intended
to “protect[] juridicial beings as real constitutional entities”).
Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 76 (1906) (“A corporation is, after all, but an association of
individuals under an assumed name and with a distinct legal entity. In organizing itself as
a collective body it waives no constitutional immunities appropriate to such body.”); see
also CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. 69, 89 (1987) (describing corporations
as “entities whose very existence and attributes are a product of state law”).
See Avi-Yonah, supra note 9, at 1019–22, 1036–39 (describing the “ultra vires” or “artificial
entity” doctrine, which “held that a [corporation] could not act contrary to the powers
conferred on it by the state,” and going on to describe examples of that doctrine in
Supreme Court opinions); Morton J. Horwitz, Santa Clara Revisited: The Development of
Corporate Theory, 88 W. VA. L. REV. 173, 181 (1985) (contrasting corporate theories
arguing that business associations have “an organic unity” wherein “the group was greater
than the mere sum of its parts,” with artificial entity theory, which postulates that
corporations are “simply artificial aggregations of individuals”). For discussion of theories rebuking the notion of a corporation as a democracy that can be policed by its shareholders, see infra notes 246–59.
See Padfield, The Dodd-Frank Corporation, supra note 8, at 229 (arguing that the adoption of
the Dodd-Frank Act underscores the regulatory power of the state with respect to the
corporation and is evidence supporting the state entity theory); see also Stephen M.
Bainbridge, Community and Statism: A Conservative Contractarian Critique of Progressive
Corporate Law Scholarship, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 856, 860–61, 864–69 (1997) (book review)
(discussing the role of government-imposed mandatory rules or default rules in
competing corporate theories).
Hillary A. Sale, The New “Public” Corporation, 74 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 137, 137–38
(2011) (reviewing the Model Business Corporation Act as a starting point for a broader
discussion of the definition of “public corporation,” and arguing that corporate directors’
failure to appreciate that “the government and the media have increasing influence over
public corporations and their governance” leads to a variety of negative consequences).
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The ever-Machiavellian Justice Scalia, writing in a concurrence with the
majority, took on Justice Stevens’s conception of what the Founding Fathers
would have thought about extending First Amendment protections to
94
Justice Scalia attempted to use a textual analysis of the
corporations.
Constitution to support the notion that the Founding Fathers did indeed
95
intend to empower corporations with First Amendment rights.
In his concurrence, Justice Scalia claimed that if the Founding Fathers
had wanted to exclude corporations from free speech rights, the First
96
Amendment would have specifically said so. Since the First Amendment
talks generally about Congress not abridging rights to free speech,
97
corporations must be included, Scalia argued.
Of course, where the Constitution discusses political leaders being
elected by “the People,” it likewise did not specifically exclude
98
corporations.
Similarly, when it discusses the qualifications a “Person”
needs to have for certain offices, it also did not exclude corporations
(though perhaps the requirements of attaining a certain age might suggest a
natural person, despite a corporation being able to exist and “age” for an
99
indefinite number of years). None of that troubled Justice Scalia. He was,

94

95

96

97

98
99

Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 130 S. Ct. 876, 926 (2010) (Scalia, J.,
concurring) (“Even if we thought it proper to apply the dissent’s approach of excluding
from First Amendment coverage what the Founders disliked, and even if we agreed that
the Founders disliked founding-era corporations; modern corporations might not qualify
for exclusion [from the First Amendment].”).
Id. at 926–29 (arguing that the First Amendment’s “lack of a textual exception” for
corporations is meaningful, and that the reference to “the freedom of . . . the press”
demonstrates that the First Amendment reaches entities other than individual Americans
(alteration in original) (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. I) (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
Id. (reasoning that the drafters of the First Amendment were aware that corporations
both existed and exercised forms of speech, and that accordingly, the “lack of a textual
exception for speech by corporations cannot be explained on the ground that such
organizations did not exist [in the founding era] or did not speak”).
Id. at 929 (“The Amendment is written in terms of ‘speech,’ not speakers. Its text offers
no foothold for excluding any category of speaker, from single individuals to partnerships
of individuals, to unincorporated associations of individuals, to incorporated associations
of individuals—and the dissent offers no evidence about the original meaning of the text
to support any such exclusion.”).
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 1 (“The House of Representatives shall be composed of
Members chosen every second Year by the People of the several States . . . .”).
U.S. CONST., art. I, § 2, cl. 2 (“No Person shall be a Representative who shall not have
attained to the Age of twenty five Years, and been seven Years a Citizen of the United
States, and who shall not, when elected, be an Inhabitant of that State in which he shall
be chosen.”); U.S. CONST., art I, § 3, cl. 3 (“No Person shall be a Senator who shall not
have attained to the Age of thirty Years, and been nine Years a Citizen of the United
States, and who shall not, when elected, be an Inhabitant of that State for which he shall
be chosen.”).
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of course, like the majority, solely focused here on “ancient First
100
Amendment principles.”
Justice Stevens responded to Justice Scalia directly, retorting that the very
idea of giving individual rights to a corporation was so inconceivable to the
Founding Fathers that it would never have crossed their minds to specifically
write into the Constitution that corporations were not entitled to individual
101
rights.
Like Justice Stevens, scholars have also criticized the majority’s
invocation of originalism in support of their Citizens United decision. One
such commentator states that the opinion “fails to persuade” that the
Framers actually wanted to empower corporations with First Amendment
102
rights.
And that, instead, the opinion “takes us on a long journey” and
103
nowhere arrives at evidence of original intent.
Throughout their discussion of original intent, the majority and both
concurring opinions seemed to manipulate any true or even remotely
accurate reading of the historical moment when the Constitution and the
Bill of Rights were drafted. Their rhetorical description of their faithfulness
to original noble principles is inspiring, but indeed, as Justice Stevens
104
himself pointed out, appears to be completely disingenuous.
Instead,
original intent seemed to be used by the majority as nothing more than a
forceful rhetorical tool put into the service of an end result: empowering
the corporation.

100
101

102

103

104

Id. at 948 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
Id. at 951–52 (“If no prominent Framer bothered to articulate that corporate speech
would have lesser status than individual speech, that may well be because the contrary
proposition—if not also the very notion of ‘corporate speech’—was inconceivable.”
(footnote omitted)).
Amanda D. Johnson, Comment, Originalism and Citizens United: The Struggle of Corporate
Personhood, 7 RUTGERS BUS. L.J. 187, 188 (2010) (advocating for deference to modern
principles in cases where original intent is unclear, and concluding that Citizens United is
such a case, wherein the majority “fails to persuade us that the Framers specifically
intended to supply corporations with First Amendment rights to free speech”).
Id. (concluding that, instead of offering persuasive evidence that the Framers’ intent was
to extend free speech rights to corporate associations, the Citizens United majority “takes
us on a long journey, providing a historical recitation of legislative and judicial opinion
about corporate free speech,” and “at no time are we offered information on the
Framers’ intent”).
Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 952 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(“The Court enlists the Framers in its defense without seriously grappling with their
understandings of corporations or the free speech right, or with the republican principles
that underlay those understandings.”).
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2. The Majority, Citing Respect for Stare Decisis, in Fact Runs Over
Precedent
In addition to original intent, the majority and dissent both focused on
another crucial aspect of constitutional interpretation: following relevant
105
precedent and respecting the principle of stare decisis. Citing precedent,
the majority specifically rejected the argument that corporations could or
should be treated differently than natural people with respect to campaign
106
finance restrictions.
“Speech restrictions based on the identity of the
107
speaker are all too often simply a means to control content.” In addition,
the majority cautioned that the very act of favoring certain speakers and
108
disadvantaging others might be unconstitutional.
The majority conceded
that some regulations that do discriminate based on the speaker have been
109
upheld in past cases as constitutional.
However, it surveyed those cases
and found that those restrictions were all crucial to the effective functioning
of government, an interest that, in the majority’s opinion, was not served by
110
the BCRA’s general ban on corporate electioneering.

105

106

107
108

109

110

Id. at 886, 911–12 (majority opinion) (detailing the Court’s factors for determining
whether to apply or reject the principle of stare decisis in a specific decision); id. at 920–
21 (Roberts, C.J., concurring) (arguing that stare decisis should not be applied
mechanically, particularly in constitutional cases); id. at 938–42 (Stevens, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part) (rejecting the majority’s rationales for departing from stare
decisis in Citizens United); see also Reza Dibadj, Citizens United as Corporate Law Narrative,
16 NEXUS: CHAP. J.L. & POL’Y 39, 39 (2010-2011) (arguing that the Citizens United majority
opinion is remarkable because it pays “precious little attention to stare decisis”).
Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 899–900 (listing precedential cases in which the Court “has
recognized that First Amendment protection extends to corporations,” including in the
specific context of political speech, and concluding that the Court “has thus rejected the
argument that political speech of corporations or other associations should be treated
differently under the First Amendment simply because such associations are not ‘natural
persons’” (quoting First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Belotti, 435 U.S. 765, 776 (1978))).
Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 899.
Id. (“Quite apart from the purpose or effect of regulating content, moreover, the
Government may commit a constitutional wrong when by law it identifies certain
preferred speakers.”).
Id. (citing cases where the Court upheld speech restrictions “based on [a compelling]
interest in allowing governmental entities to perform their functions” in the context of
public schools, the corrections system, the military, and federal service).
Id. (“The corporate independent expenditures at issue in this case [under the BCRA],
however, would not interfere with governmental functions, so these cases [approving of
restrictions of speech when a compelling interest in preserving governmental functions is
present] are inapposite.”). Despite the Court’s dismissal of this rationale as applied to
the constitutionality of the BCRA, an argument could easily be made that the distorting
effects of corporate electioneers directly interfere with the effective functioning of
elections and, by extension, whether the government represents the people it governs.
See generally James A. Gardner, Anti-regulatory Absolutism in the Campaign Arena: Citizens
United and the Implied Slippery Slope, 20 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 673 (2011) (exploring
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The majority placed primary reliance on First National Bank of Boston v.
Bellotti to find that “corporations or other associations should [not] be
treated differently under the First Amendment simply because such
111
associations are not ‘natural persons.’” Decided by the Supreme Court in
1978, Bellotti involved a state statute that restricted corporate expenditures
112
related to certain referendum items. It is important to emphasize that the
Bellotti case dealt not with restrictions relating to the election of politicians,
113
but with general referendum items, issues not as likely to incite corruption
as support for, or opposition to, specific candidates. The Bellotti Court
found that corporations are entitled to certain First Amendment protections
and that the corporation did not lose the protection of that amendment
114
simply because it was a corporation and not a natural person.
The majority used the Bellotti opinion to support the idea that no
distinctions could ever be made between corporations and individuals with
115
respect to free speech rights.
The majority did not seem troubled by the
fact that the issue in Bellotti and the issue in Citizens United had a crucial
116
distinction. Indeed, cases like Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce
(decided after Bellotti) confronted the exact issue before the Court in Citizens
117
United and upheld the relevant statute.
Those cases distinguished Bellotti

111
112

113

114

115

116

117

the conceivable dangers to democratic self-rule and popular sovereignty that might result
from the failure to impose campaign speech and spending regulation).
Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 900 (quoting Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 776).
Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 767–68 (“The statute at issue [. . .] prohibits [. . .] corporations[] from
making contributions or expenditures for the purpose of [. . .] influencing or affecting
the vote on any question submitted to the voters, other than one materially affecting any
of the property, business or assets of the corporation.” (footnote omitted) (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
Id. at 767 (describing the Massachusetts statute at issue as “a state criminal statute that
forbids certain expenditures by banks and business corporations for the purpose of
influencing the vote on referendum proposals”).
Id. at 784 (“We thus find no support in the First . . . Amendment, or in the decisions of
this Court, for the proposition that speech that otherwise would be within the protection
of the First Amendment loses that protection simply because its source is a
corporation . . . .”)
Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 904 (employing the Bellotti Court’s premise that the First
Amendment’s protection of political speech “does not depend on the identity of its
source, whether corporation, association, union, or individual” (quoting Bellotti, 435 U.S.
at 777) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
494 U.S. 652 (1990) (upholding the constitutionality of a Michigan statute that, like the
BCRA, prohibited corporations from spending corporate treasury funds on
electioneering communications), overruled by Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 913.
Austin v. Mich. State Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 655 (1990) (holding that the
statute at issue passed strict scrutiny, because it was “narrowly tailored to serve a
compelling state interest,” and describing the effect of the statute as “prohibit[ing]
corporations from making contributions and independent expenditures in connection
with state candidate elections”); see also McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 540 U.S. 93
(2003).
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because the restriction in Bellotti related to referendum items, items not
118
likely to incite corruption, and not individual politicians seeking office.
119
The Citizens United majority also relied on Buckley v. Valeo. In Buckley—
which was decided in 1976, just two years before Bellotti—the Court
confronted a limit on independent expenditures from individuals as well as
120
corporations and unions.
The Buckley Court found that regulation to be
an unconstitutional burden on free speech since the Court reasoned that
the regulation did not serve any compelling purpose in combating quid pro
121
quo corruption.
However, the Buckley Court did not confront the separate question of
whether restrictions on independent expenditures coming only from
122
corporations or unions would be unconstitutional.
Nonetheless, the
Citizens United majority cited to Buckley for the proposition that if such a
restriction were to be challenged (as it was in Citizens United), the reasoning
123
in Buckley could not support it.
In other words, Buckley did not confront

118

119
120

121

122

123

Austin, 494 U.S. at 659 (citing Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 788 n.26, for the proposition that the
Court has “recognized that a legislature might demonstrate a danger of real or apparent
corruption posed by such expenditures when made by corporations to influence
candidate elections,” as opposed to the less serious referendum context at issue in
Bellotti). In fact, the Bellotti opinion “squarely disavowed the proposition for which the
majority cites it” in Citizens United, i.e. that corporations and unions could not be treated
differently from individuals for purposes of campaign regulation. Citizens United, 130 S.
Ct. at 958 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
424 U.S. 1 (1976).
Id. at 7 (“The statutes at issue summarized in broad terms, contain the following
provisions: (a) individual political contributions are limited to $1,000 to any single
candidate per election, with an overall annual limitation of $25,000 by any contributor;
independent expenditures by individuals and groups ‘relative to a clearly identified
candidate’ are limited to $1,000 a year; campaign spending by candidates for various
federal offices and spending for national conventions by political parties are subject to
prescribed limits; (b) contributions and expenditures above certain threshold levels must
be reported and publicly disclosed; (c) a system for public funding of Presidential
campaign activities is established by Subtitle H of the Internal Revenue Code; and (d) a
Federal Election Commission is established to administer and enforce the legislation.”).
Id. at 45 (finding that even “assuming, arguendo, that large independent expenditures
pose the same dangers of actual or apparent quid pro quo arrangements as do large
contributions, [the statute in question] does not provide an answer that sufficiently
relates to the elimination of those dangers,” because it did not establish a total ban on
large expenditures and so did not sufficiently eliminate the potential danger of undue
influence, because an enterprising person could devise independent expenditures that
circumvent the regulation’s restrictions).
Id. at 29 n.31 (“The Act places no limit on the number of funds that may be formed
through the use of subsidiaries or divisions of corporations, or of local and regional units
of a national labor union.”).
Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 902 (“Buckley did not consider [FECA] § 610’s separate ban on
corporate and union independent expenditures . . . . Had [FECA] § 610 been challenged
in the wake of Buckley, however, it could not have been squared with the reasoning and
analysis of that precedent.”).
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the same question that the Citizens United Court was confronting, but the
majority relied on Buckley nonetheless, because the reasoning alone in that
124
case suggested to them that the BCRA should be ruled unconstitutional.
As mentioned above, two cases decided after Bellotti and Buckley actually
did take up questions that were essentially identical to the issue presented in
Citizens United. The majority cited and discussed those subsequent cases,
125
126
Austin and McConnell v. FEC.
The majority found that those cases were
simply not in accord with the First Amendment jurisprudence of Bellotti and
Buckley, despite the fact that the Courts in those cases had found their
127
resolution of the cases to be entirely consonant with Bellotti and Buckley.
But the majority in Citizens United simply disagreed, and thus the relevant
parts of those cases (Austin completely and McConnell in part) were
128
overruled as aberrations.
In Austin, decided approximately twenty years before Citizens United, the
Court confronted a Michigan state statute restricting independent
129
expenditures by corporations supporting or opposing political candidates.
Austin upheld the restriction on corporations, reasoning that corporate
130
electioneering could have a corrupting and distorting effect on elections.
Thus, the regulations in question were justified and passed constitutional

124

125
126
127

128
129
130

Id. at 908 (citing Buckley’s proposition that the governmental interest in preventing
corruption or the appearance of corruption is insufficient as applied to independent
expenditures because of its chilling effect on speech and the lessened potential for
corruption involved in independent expenditures).
494 U.S. 652 (1990), overruled by Citizens United, 130 S. Ct at 913; see also supra text
accompanying notes 116–18.
Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 540 U.S. 93 (2003), overruled in part by Citizens
United, 130 S. Ct at 913.
Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 912–15 (rejecting Austin as “contraven[ing] this Court’s
earlier precedents in Buckley and Bellotti” and accordingly overruling “the part of
McConnell that upheld BCRA § 203’s extension of [2 U.S.C.] § 441b’s restrictions on
corporate independent expenditures”); McConnell, 540 U.S. at 122 (distinguishing Buckley
because that case “addressed issues that primarily related to contributions and
expenditures by individuals, since none of the parties challenged the prohibition on
contributions by corporations and labor unions”); Austin, 494 U.S. at 659 (identifying
support in Buckley and Bellotti for the propositions that, although the Court “has
distinguished [independent] expenditures from direct [campaign] contributions, [. . .] it
has also recognized that a legislature might demonstrate a danger of real or apparent
corruption” from corporate independent expenditures) (citing Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 788
n.26; Buckley, 424 U.S. at 47).
Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 913.
Austin, 494 U.S. at 655–56.
Id. at 661 (“Although some closely held corporations, just as some publicly held ones,
may not have accumulated significant amounts of wealth, they receive from the State the
special benefits conferred by the corporate structure and present the potential for
distorting the political process. This potential for distortion justifies [the statute’s]
general applicability to all corporations.”).
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131

scrutiny. McConnell, decided seven years before Citizens United, scrutinized
132
the very same statute under consideration in Citizens United: the BCRA.
The McConnell Court relied on Austin to uphold restrictions on corporate
electioneering based in part on the potential for such electioneering to
133
corrupt and distort elections.
One of the primary criticisms leveled by Justice Stevens’s Citizens United
134
dissent (and by President Obama) was that the majority of the Court
overturned a century of precedent allowing for regulations of corporations
135
in the area of corporate finance.
Well-known constitutional law scholar
Laurence Tribe has written that the Citizens United opinion shows that the
136
Roberts Court has no “genuine concern with adherence to precedent.”
In his dissent, Justice Stevens stated that “[t]he final principle of judicial
137
process that the majority violates is the most transparent: stare decisis.”
Indeed, as just discussed, the majority specifically overturned Austin and that
portion of McConnell that upheld the BCRA’s regulation of corporate
138
electioneering.
However, the Citizens United majority was also clear that
Austin and part of McConnell were the only cases that needed to be
139
overturned.
As both cases were decided within the past twenty years, in

131
132
133

134
135

136

137
138
139

Id. at 666 (“[W]e hold that [the Michigan statute] does not violate the First
Amendment . . . .”).
McConnell, 540 U.S. at 114 (“In this opinion we discuss Titles I and II of BCRA.”).
Id. at 205 (“We have repeatedly sustained legislation aimed at the corrosive and distorting
effects of immense aggregations of wealth that are accumulated with the help of the
corporate form and that have little or no correlation to the public’s support for the
corporation’s political ideas.” (quoting Austin, 494 U.S. at 660) (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
See Obama, supra note 26, at 8 (“[T]he Supreme Court reversed a century of law [in
Citizens United] . . . .”).
Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 130 S. Ct. 876, 940 (2010) (Stevens, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“Although the majority opinion spends
several pages making these surprising arguments [in favor of overruling precedent in
Citizens United], it says almost nothing about the standard considerations we have used to
determine stare decisis value, such as the antiquity of the precedent, the workability of its
legal rule, and the reliance interests at stake. It is also conspicuously silent about
McConnell, even though the McConnell Court’s decision to uphold BCRA § 203 relied not
only on the antidistortion logic of Austin but also on the statute’s historical
pedigree . . . .”).
Laurence H. Tribe, What Should Congress Do About Citizens United?, SCOTUSBLOG, (Jan.
24, 2010, 10:30 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/?p=15469 (“There is no doubt that
Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission . . . signals the end of whatever legitimate
claim could otherwise have been made by the Roberts Court to . . . a genuine concern
with adherence to precedent.”).
Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 938 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
See supra note 128.
Cf. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 913 (majority opinion) (overruling Austin and overruling
McConnell in part, and then concluding that the BCRA could then be considered
unconstitutional).
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the majority’s view, its action was not a denouncement of a century of
regulation but rather a correction of relatively recent case law that was an
140
aberration.
With expressed deference to precedent, the Citizens United majority
reiterated its previous position that “[s]tare decisis is a principle of policy and
141
not a mechanical formula of adherence to the latest decision.” The Court
made clear that it would respect precedent unless respecting precedent put
142
it “on a course that is sure error.”
Again stressing the importance of free
political speech and the right of all people to speak and also to hear every
political message that they choose to, the Court found Austin and McConnell
to represent unsustainable infringements on First Amendment rights,
143
despite its proclaimed respect for precedent.
Justice Stevens lambasted the majority, explaining in clear and harsh
terms why stare decisis is so crucial, and then arguing that the majority
violated the principle by ignoring a century of precedent in order to reach
144
the result it desired in this case.
Justice Stevens cited laws and cases that
were more than one hundred years old to support the notion that
corporations could be treated differently than individuals for free speech
145
purposes in the context of elections. He cited the Tillman Act of 1907 as
146
banning all corporate contributions to candidates.
The debate revolving
around the passage of that Act more than one hundred years ago discussed
the enormous power of corporations and both the actual and perceived
147
corrupting effects corporations have on elections. The Taft-Hartley Act of
140

141
142
143
144
145

146
147

Id. at 903 (identifying two “conflicting lines of precedent: a pre-Austin line that forbids
restrictions on political speech based on the speaker’s corporate identity and a postAustin line that permits them”).
Id. at 912 (quoting Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U.S. 106, 119 (1940)) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
Id. at 911–12 (“Our precedent is to be respected unless the most convincing of reasons
demonstrates that adherence to it put us on a course that is sure error.”).
Id. at 912–13.
Id. at 938–42 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (criticizing the
majority for its failure to adequately justify its departure from precedent).
Id. at 952–54 (identifying an “express distinction between corporate and individual
political spending on elections” that “stretches back to 1907, when Congress passed the
Tillman Act,” and also referring to the Taft-Hartley Act of 1947 and the Federal Election
Campaign Act of 1971).
Id. at 952–53.
See Tillman Act of 1907, Pub. L. No. 59-36, 34 Stat. 864 (codified as amended at 2 U.S.C
§ 441b (2006)) (prohibiting campaign contributions by corporations); see also Citizens
United, 130 S. Ct. at 952–53 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(“[T]he evils of the use of [corporate] money in connection with political elections are so
generally recognized that the committee deems it unnecessary to make any argument in
favor of the general purpose of this measure. It is in the interest of good government and
calculated to promote purity in the selection of public officials.” (quoting S. REP. NO.
3056, 59th Cong., 1st Sess., 2 (1906)) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
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1947 enacted restrictions on indirect corporate expenditures on elections.
Congress passed the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 to restrict the
general use of corporate money for contributions and expenditures, again
out of a fear of the corrupting influence corporations can have on
149
elections.
In addition to those legislative acts, Justice Stevens of course discussed
Austin and McConnell, the cases the majority deemed to have been resolved
150
incorrectly.
Suddenly, argued Justice Stevens, the majority had decided
that corporations should not be regulated differently than individuals in this
151
context of campaign finance. According to Justice Stevens, the majority’s
decision lie in stark contrast to more than one hundred years of precedent
152
and practice and the rhetoric that somehow the BCRA diminished the
constitutional right to free speech was simply that—rhetoric. The majority’s
decision to fly in the face of stare decisis and established precedent “comes
down to nothing more than its disagreement with [the law and those
153
cases].”
Justice Stevens discussed the reliance aspects of stare decisis. He
explained that individuals and politicians all rely on stare decisis to shape
154
155
their behavior.
Individuals behave in accord with the new case law.

148

149

150
151

152
153
154

The primary focus being unions. See Labor Management Relations Act of 1947 (“TaftHartley Act”), Pub. L. No. 80-101, § 304, 61 Stat. 136, 159–60 (1947) (banning political
contributions, including independent expenditures, by labor organizations); Allison R.
Hayward, Revisiting the Fable of Reform, 45 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 421, 448, 456–63 (2008)
(examining the development and effect of the Taft-Hartley Act, with a particular focus on
the expenditure ban in § 304, and characterizing the Act as “anti-union legislation”);
Robert H. Sitkoff, Corporate Political Speech, Political Extortion, and the Competition for
Corporate Charters, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1103, 1130 & n.108 (2002) (noting that the TaftHartley Act was amended to apply to unions).
See generally The Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 (“FECA”), Pub. L. No. 92–225, 86
Stat. 3 (1972) (codified as amended at 2 U.S.C. §§ 431–455 (2006)); FECA Amendments
of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-443, 88 Stat. 1263 (1974); see also H.R. REP. NO. 93-1239, at 120,
131 (1974) (relying on the Watergate Scandal to justify greater congressional involvement
to prevent campaign finance corruption).
See generally Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 938–79 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (discussing both cases extensively).
Id. at 960–61 (“Time and again, we have recognized these realities in approving measures
that Congress and the States have taken. None of the cases the majority cites is to the
contrary. The only thing new about Austin was the dissent, with its stunning failure to
appreciate the legitimacy of interests recognized in the name of democratic integrity
since the days of the Progressives.”).
Id. (identifying a line of campaign finance precedent upholding corporate regulation
that has existed “[c]ontinuously for over 100 years”).
Id. at 941–42 (“[T]he Court’s rejection of Austin and McConnell comes down to nothing
more than its disagreement with their results.”).
Id. at 940 (“We have recognized that [s]tare decisis has special force when legislators or
citizens have acted in reliance on a previous decision, for in this instance overruling the
decision would dislodge settled rights and expectations or require an extensive legislative

792

JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

[Vol. 15:3

Lawmakers fashion subsequent regulations within the parameters of prior
156
In this specific case, Justice Stevens pointed out that Congress
decisions.
had developed a record 100,000 pages long when it debated the BCRA and
that all of those discussions, compromises, and solutions were in reliance on
157
the settled precedent of Austin.
The dialogue between the branches of
158
government is not to be taken lightly.
Justice Stevens described the
overruling of Austin and the relevant part of McConnell as “[p]ulling out the
159
rug beneath Congress.” Justice Stevens went on to describe the majority’s
160
behavior as “procedural dereliction.”
In its opinion, the majority appealed to one of the primary tools of
constitutional interpretation, looking to precedent and respecting the
161
principle of stare decisis.
It paid deference to those principles, but, of
course, in this case found an exception and overruled the well-established
162
precedent cases Austin and McConnell.
It ignored legislation regulating
163
corporations that has been passed periodically for over a hundred years. It
relied on strained interpretations of cases from the 1970s, Bellotti and
Buckley, to support its decision, despite the fact that those cases did not
164
confront the same question as the one presented in Citizens United. Austin

155

156
157

158
159
160
161

162
163

164

response.” (alteration in original) (quoting Hubbard v. United States, 514 U.S. 695, 714
(1995)) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
Id. (“Stare decisis protects not only personal rights involving property or contract but also
the ability of the elected branches to shape their laws in an effective and coherent
fashion.”).
Id. (“State legislatures have relied on their authority to regulate corporate electioneering,
confirmed in Austin, for more than a century.” (footnote omitted)).
Id. (“The Federal Congress has relied on this authority [to regulate corporate
electioneering under Supreme Court precedent prior to Citizens United] for a comparable
stretch of time, and it specifically relied on Austin throughout the years it spent
developing and debating BCRA. The total record it compiled was 100,000 pages long.”
(footnote omitted)).
Cf. id. (“Pulling out the rug beneath Congress after affirming the constitutionality of
[BCRA] § 203 six years ago shows great disrespect for a coequal branch.”).
Id.
Id. at 942 (“The novelty of the Court’s procedural dereliction and its approach to stare
decisis is matched by the novelty of its ruling on the merits.”).
See id. at 911–12 (majority opinion) (noting the importance of stare decisis and
describing the various considerations that inform the decision whether or not to deviate
from stare decisis in a specific case).
Id. at 913.
See id. at 960 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (noting that laws
regulating corporate participation in candidate elections have been enacted
“[c]ontinuously for over 100 years,” in response to “documented threats to electoral
integrity” (quoting Fed. Election Comm’n v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449, 522
(2007) (Souter, J., dissenting))).
See id. at 958–61 (distinguishing Buckley from Citizens United by explaining that Buckley
“focused on a very different statutory provision” that does not map onto the independent
expenditure ban at hand in Citizens United, and distinguishing Bellotti as adjudicating the
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and McConnell, the cases the majority overruled, did confront the same
165
question. The majority went out of its way to overturn those cases and the
principle of stare decisis in order to empower the corporation.

3. The Majority Finds No Interest Sufficient to Limit a Corporation’s Free
Speech
Of course, as mentioned briefly above, the Citizens United majority did
acknowledge that some restrictions on First Amendment freedom of speech
166
are permissible.
The jurisprudential test that has evolved to balance the
constitutional interest against the interest promoted by the regulation is the
167
strict scrutiny test.
Under that test, the government must prove that the
regulation “furthers a compelling interest and is narrowly tailored to achieve
168
that interest.”
The FEC’s defense of the BCRA built on the Austin case, which
acknowledged that three interests were sufficient to support regulating
169
corporations in the campaign finance area.
Those interests are
anticorruption, antidistortion, and, perhaps most importantly for our
170
inquiry into the nature of a corporation, shareholder protection.
The
majority of the Citizens United Court considered those rationales and rejected
all three of them in concert with the overturning of Austin and part of
171
McConnell.
With no compelling interest left to support the BCRA, the
172
Court reasoned that the regulation did not pass strict scrutiny.

165
166

167
168
169

170
171

172

validity of “a state statute that barred business corporations’ expenditures on some
referenda but not others”).
See id. at 960 (noting that Austin and McConnell hold that a compelling state interest exists
in regulating corporate expenditures to political activity).
Id. at 899 (majority opinion) (“The Court has upheld a narrow class of speech restrictions
that operate to the disadvantage of certain persons, but these rulings were based on an
interest in allowing governmental entities to perform their functions.”).
See id. at 898 (“Laws that burden political speech are ‘subject to strict scrutiny[]’ . . .”
(quoting WRTL, 551 U.S. at 464)).
Id. (quoting WRTL, 551 U.S. at 464) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. at 903 (acknowledging the Government’s reliance on the antidistortion rationale from
Austin, as well as the anticorruption interest and shareholder-protection interests in its
argument supporting corporate-speech restrictions).
Id.
See id. at 904–11 (rejecting the antidistortion rationale from Austin, the anticorruption
rationale from Buckley, and the shareholder-protection rationale, with the result of
overturning Austin and a portion of McConnell).
See id. at 913 (overruling Austin and the part of McConnell that had upheld BCRA § 203).
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a. Anticorruption
The majority discussed these three rationales relatively briefly,
considering the expanse of its opinion. With respect to corruption, the
majority reviewed relevant cases that discussed corruption and determined
that those cases essentially acknowledged that safeguarding against quid pro
quo corruption was a sufficient purpose to allow for some limitations on free
173
174
speech.
The majority specifically relied on Buckley in this regard.
The
Buckley Court upheld limitations on direct contributions to candidates,
reasoning that there the possibility of quid pro quo corruption was sufficient
175
to justify the limitations. However, the Buckley Court struck down limits on
176
electioneering that applied to corporations, unions, and individuals alike.
With respect to those electioneering limitations, the Buckley Court found
that there was no reason to assume that quid pro quo corruption was at risk
with electioneering since there is no arrangement with a candidate in
177
advance.
Thus, the Buckley Court struck down that limitation on free
178
speech as not being justified by the anticorruption rationale.
It bears
repeating, however, that the electioneering restriction struck down in
Buckley applied not only to entities like corporations and unions, but also to
individuals. Thus, the Buckley case is distinguishable from the Citizens United
case, where no individual’s right to free speech was at stake at all. Austin and
McConnell both recognized this distinction and were able to uphold
179
restrictions on corporations, consonant with Buckley.
173

174
175

176

177

178
179

Id. at 908 (pointing to the Court’s finding in Buckley that the anticorruption interest was
“‘sufficiently important’ to allow limits on contributions. . . .” (quoting Buckley v. Valeo,
424 U.S. 1, 25 (1976))).
See, e.g., id. at 901–02, 908–10 (citing Buckley, 424 U.S. at 1).
Buckley, 424 U.S. at 26–27 (“It is unnecessary to look beyond the Act’s primary purpose—
to limit the actuality and appearance of corruption resulting from large individual
financial contributions—in order to find a constitutionally sufficient justification for the
$1,000 contribution limitation. . . . To the extent that large contributions are given to
secure a political quid pro quo from current and potential office holders, the integrity of
our system of representative democracy is undermined.”).
Id. at 45 (“We find that the governmental interest in preventing corruption and the
appearance of corruption is inadequate to justify [FECA] § 608(e)(1)’s ceiling on
independent expenditures. . . . [Even] assuming, arguendo, that large independent
expenditures pose the same dangers of actual or apparent quid pro quo arrangements as
do large contributions, § 608(e)(1) does not provide an answer that sufficiently relates to
the elimination of these dangers.”).
Id. at 47 (“The absence of prearrangement and coordination of an expenditure with the
candidate or his agent not only undermines the value of the expenditure to the
candidate, but also alleviates the danger that expenditures will be given as a quid pro quo
for improper commitments from the candidate.”).
Id. at 45 (“[T]he governmental interest in preventing corruption and the appearance of
corruption is inadequate to justify § 608(e)(1)’s ceiling on independent expenditures.”).
McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 540 U.S. 93, 122 (2003) (“Our opinion in Buckley
addressed issues that primarily related to contributions and expenditures by individuals,
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The Citizens United majority also relied on Bellotti as standing for the idea
that speech should not be restricted based on the identity of the speaker,
180
Once again, though, the Citizens
regardless of the specter of corruption.
United majority glossed over the fact that the restriction on electioneering in
the Bellotti case related only to referendum items, arguably issues where
corruption would be less likely than electioneering related directly to a
181
political candidate.
The Citizens United majority did acknowledge that a
footnote in the Bellotti case left open the possibility that corporate
182
electioneering could, in fact, lead to corruption.
However, the Citizens
United majority quickly dismissed the significance of that footnote and
183
returned to its reliance on Buckley.
The Court overlooked once again the
distinction that the regulation at stake in the Buckley case also was regulating
184
independent expenditures by individuals.
The majority then went on to reason that there is simply no evidence
that general independent expenditures could lead to corruption or its

180

181

182

183

184

since none of the parties challenged the prohibition on contributions by corporations
and labor unions.” (citing Buckley, 424 U.S. at 28 n.31)); McConnell, 540 U.S. at 138 (“Like
the contribution limits we upheld in Buckley, [the restrictions in the statute at issue] have
only a marginal impact on the ability of contributors, candidates, officeholders, and
parties to engage in effective political speech.”); Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce,
494 U.S. 652, 659 (1990) (“Although this Court has distinguished [independent]
expenditures from direct contributions in the context of federal laws regulating
individual donors, it has also recognized that a legislature might demonstrate a danger of
real or apparent corruption posed by such expenditures when made by corporations to
influence candidate elections . . . .” (citing Buckley, 424 U.S. at 47)), overruled by Citizens
United, 130 S. Ct. 913; see also Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 957–60 (Stevens, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part) (arguing that the Court’s decisions in Buckley and Bellotti
are consistent with Austin and McConnell).
Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 902 (majority opinion) (“Bellotti reaffirmed the First
Amendment principle that the Government cannot restrict political speech based on the
speaker’s corporate identity.” (citation omitted)).
See id. at 958–59 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“The
anticorruption interests that animate regulations of corporate participation in candidate
elections . . . do not apply equally to regulations of corporate participation in
referenda.”).
Id. at 909 (majority opinion) (acknowledging that a “footnote in Bellotti purported to
leave open the possibility that corporate independent expenditures could be shown to
cause corruption” (citing First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 788 n.26
(1978))).
Id. (dismissing the importance of Bellotti by arguing that the Bellotti footnote is “dictum”
that “is thus supported only by a law review student comment, which misinterpreted
Buckley”) (citation omitted).
See id. at 958 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (describing Buckley’s
holding as “evaluating ‘the ancillary governmental interest in equalizing the relative
ability of individuals and groups to influence the outcome of elections’” and explaining
that, despite the majority’s reliance on Buckley, “[i]t is not apparent why this is relevant to
the case before us” (quoting Buckley, 424 U.S. at 48)); see also McConnell, 540 U.S. at 122
(“Our opinion in Buckley addressed issues that primarily related to contributions and
expenditures by individuals . . . .”).
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185

The majority surmised that there was no valid interest in
appearance.
eliminating corruption that could justify the supposedly drastic limitation on
186
the corporation’s constitutional right to free speech.
In his dissent, Justice Stevens lambasted the majority’s “crabbed view of
187
corruption.”
Justice Stevens wrote sarcastically to say that the rhetoric of
the majority’s opinion had some appeal, but that it did not even begin to
188
approach the reality of the political arena.
The majority argued the
simple platitude that more free speech is always better and that our citizenry
and our democracy depend on the ability to both deliver and to hear
189
political messages. The majority confined corruption to clear examples of
quid pro quo corruption and submitted that only such clear examples of
190
corruption should be allowed to interfere with the right to free speech.
Justice Stevens accused the majority’s approach to corruption of lacking
191
of any serious analysis. Justice Stevens cited to the district court’s opinion
192
in McConnell, written by Judge Kollar-Kotelly.
That opinion discussed the
subtleties of corruption and the evidence that electioneering involves

185
186

187
188

189

190

191

192

See Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 910 (majority opinion) (claiming that “there is only scant
evidence that independent expenditures even ingratiate”).
See id. at 911 (“When Congress finds that a problem exists, we must give that finding due
deference; but Congress may not choose an unconstitutional remedy. If elected officials
succumb to improper influences from independent expenditures; if they surrender their
best judgment; and if they put expediency before principle, then surely there is cause for
concern. We must give weight to attempts by Congress to seek to dispel either the
appearance or the reality of these influences. The remedies enacted by law, however,
must comply with the First Amendment; and, it is our law and our tradition that more
speech, not less, is the governing rule. An outright ban on corporate political speech
during the critical preelection period is not a permissible remedy.”).
Id. at 961 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting McConnell, 540
U.S. at 152) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. at 979 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“Today’s decision is
backwards in many senses. It elevates the majority’s agenda over the litigants’
submissions, facial attacks over as-applied claims, broad constitutional theories over
narrow statutory grounds, individual dissenting opinions over precedential holdings,
assertion over tradition, absolutism over empiricism, rhetoric over reality.”).
Id. at 911 (majority opinion) (“[I]t is our law and our tradition that more speech, not
less, is the governing rule.”); see also id. at 904 (“Political speech is indispensable to
decisionmaking in a democracy . . . .” (quoting First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435
U.S. 765, 777 (1978)) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
See id. at 901–09, (identifying the original support for the anticorruption interest as
“concern that large contributions could be given to secure a political quid pro quo,” and
arguing that independent expenditures do not create sufficient risk of quid pro quo
corruption to justify a limitation on political speech (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 435 U.S. 1,
26 (1976)) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 968 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(“Rather than show any deference to a coordinate branch of Government, the majority
thus rejects the anticorruption rationale without serious analysis.”).
Id. at 961–62, 966 (citing McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 251 F. Supp. 2d 176, 555–
60, 622–25 (D.D.C. 2003)).
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193

indirect forms of influence peddling. Judge Kollar-Kotelly had found that
politicians routinely request corporations to make electioneering
communications so that the politicians themselves do not have to engage in
194
disseminating certain messages.
She also discovered that politicians
routinely communicate with corporations to thank them for distributing
195
those messages. In addition, she found that a vast portion of the American
public—80%—believe that corporations get paybacks for engaging in
196
political electioneering.
One lobbyist had even testified that indirect
expenditures generate more influence with politicians than direct
197
198
contributions. That testimony went uncontroverted.
In addition to citing Judge Kollar-Kotelly’s findings, Justice Stevens also
cited to the voluminous legislative record—more than 100,000 pages—
199
supporting the electioneering restriction that was under consideration.
193

194

195

196

197

198

199

McConnell, 251 F. Supp. 2d at 623–24 (“The factual findings of the Court illustrate that
corporations and labor unions routinely notify Members of Congress as soon as they air
electioneering communications relevant to the members’ elections. The record also
indicates that Members express appreciation to the organizations for airing these
election-related advertisements.” (citation omitted)); Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 961–63,
966 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“In a careful analysis, Judge
Kollar-Kotelly made numerous findings about the corrupting consequences of corporate
and union independent expenditures in the years preceding BCRA’s passage.” (citing
McConnell, 251 F. Supp. 2d at 555–60)).
McConnell, 251 F. Supp. 2d at 623 (“Members of Congress are particularly grateful when
negative issue advertisements are run by these organizations, leaving the candidates free
to run positive advertisements and be seen as ‘above the fray.’ . . . The Findings also
demonstrate that Members of Congress seek to have corporations and unions run these
advertisements on their behalf.”); see also Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 962 (Stevens, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing McConnell, 251 F. Supp. 2d at 623–24).
McConnell, 251 F. Supp. 2d at 623 (noting that Members of Congress “express
appreciation to organizations for the airing of” electioneering communications); see also
Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 961–62 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(citing McConnell, 251 F. Supp. 2d at 623–24).
McConnell, 251 F. Supp. 2d at 623–24 (“Finally, a large majority of Americans (80%) are
of the view that corporations and other organizations that engage in electioneering
communications, which benefit specific elected officials, receive special consideration
from these officials when matters arise that affect those corporations and
organizations.”); Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 962 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (citing McConnell, 251 F. Supp. 2d at 623–24).
McConnell, 251 F. Supp. 2d at 556 (“[U]nregulated expenditures—whether soft money
donations to the parties or issue ad campaigns—can sometimes generate far more
influence than direct campaign contributions.” (internal citations omitted)); see also
Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 966 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(quoting McConnell, 251 F. Supp. 2d at 556).
McConnell, 251 F. Supp. 2d at 556 (“Plaintiffs have put forth no contrary evidence to rebut
the testimony of these consultants and lobbyist.”); see also Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 966
(Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting McConnell, 251 F. Supp.
2d at 556).
Id. at 940 (citing David B. Magleby, The Importance of the Record in McConnell v. FEC, 3
ELECTION L.J. 285 (2004)).
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Congress had studied the issue and concluded that corporations involved in
electioneering were routinely granted more access to politicians, and gained
200
Somehow, those findings of Judge Kollar-Kotelly and of
favor with them.
Congress were not sufficient for the majority.
b. Antidistortion
201

The Citizens United majority confronted the antidistortion rationale.
202
That rationale was developed clearly in the Austin case.
As mentioned
above, in Austin a Michigan statute forbade corporate electioneering
203
designed to support or denounce any particular political candidate.
The
Austin Court ruled that the massive accumulation of wealth in a corporation
204
can have a distorting effect on elections.
Preventing that distortion was
sufficient justification to support the statute, despite its limitation on
205
corporate free speech.
The Citizens United majority considered this antidistortion rationale and
206
rejected it. The majority stressed the importance of a democratic right to
free speech and reasoned that simply because people came together to form
an association in the form of a corporation, those people should not have
207
their fundamental rights to free speech trampled.
The majority also addressed the notion that the corporation uses funds
accumulated for other purposes and may not accurately reflect the views of

200

201

202

203
204

205
206
207

Id. at 961, 966 (noting that “the record Congress developed in passing BCRA” is “a
remarkable testament to the energy and ingenuity with which corporations, unions,
lobbyists, and politicians may go about scratching each other’s backs”).
Id. at 904–08 (majority opinion) (rejecting the proposition that the government can
legitimately restrict speech in order to equalize the influence of individuals and groups
over elections).
Id. at 904 (describing that interest as “Austin’s antidistortion rationale”); see also Austin v.
Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 660 (1990) (“We find that the Act is
precisely targeted to eliminate the distortion caused by corporate spending while also
allowing corporations to express their political views.”), overruled by Citizens United, 130 S.
Ct. at 913.
Austin, 494 U.S. at 655–56.
Id. at 668–69 (“[T]he Michigan Campaign Finance Act reduces the threat that huge
corporate treasuries amassed with the aid of favorable state laws will be used to influence
unfairly the outcome of elections.”).
Id. at 659–60 (upholding the constitutionality of the Michigan Campaign Finance Act).
Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 904–08 (evaluating and eventually rejecting the antidistortion
rationale as an insufficient interest to support the BCRA under strict scrutiny).
Id. at 904 (“If the First Amendment has any force, it prohibits Congress from fining or
jailing citizens, or associations of citizens, for simply engaging in political speech. If the
antidistortion rationale were to be accepted, however, it would permit Government to
ban political speech simply because the speaker is an association that has taken on the
corporate form.”).
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208

Instead, corporate electioneering is likely to distort or
its shareholders.
209
even controvert the views of its shareholders. The majority found this idea
to be without merit, arguing that all political speakers fund their speech
210
through some market mechanism.
It is simply unacceptable to use that
211
argument to restrict free speech, or all free speech could be so regulated.
The majority also argued that the antidistortion rationale could enable
possible restrictions on media corporations, which obviously have a potential
212
to distort public opinion.
Such restrictions on the media would simply
213
also be unacceptable in our democracy. It is interesting to note, however,
that restrictions on media corporations were specifically carved out of the
214
regulation under consideration in Citizens United.
Thus, again, the
majority was taking up a concern that was not presented by the case at hand.
In his dissent, Justice Stevens was again adamant that the majority
approach had ignored reality, experience, and the empirical research upon
215
which Congress based its decision to pass the BCRA. Here Justice Stevens
actually did consider the nature of a corporation and its difference from
216
natural people.
He was again sarcastic with the majority, claiming that it
217
seemed not to notice that difference at all.
He stated that “corporations

208

209

210

211

212
213

214

215
216
217

Id. at 911 (rejecting these notions and asserting that there is “little evidence of abuse that
cannot be corrected by shareholders ‘through the procedures of corporate democracy’”
(quoting First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 794 (1978))).
See id. at 953, 977 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“When
corporations use general treasury funds to praise or attack a particular candidate for
office, it is the shareholders, as the residual claimants, who are effectively footing the bill.
Those shareholders who disagree with the corporation’s electoral message may find their
financial investments being used to undermine their political convictions.”).
Id. at 884 (majority opinion) (“All speakers, including individuals and the media, use
money amassed from the economic marketplace to fund their speech, and the First
Amendment protects the resulting speech.”).
Id. at 905–06 (describing the logical ramifications of accepting the antidistortion
principle, and concluding that, if accepted, that principle would allow widespread
suppression of political speech).
Id. (“Austin’s antidistortion rationale would produce the dangerous, and unacceptable,
consequence that Congress could ban political speech of media corporations.”).
Id. at 886, 906–08 (“Differential treatment of media corporations and other corporations
cannot be squared with the First Amendment, and there is no support for the view that
the Amendment’s original meaning would permit suppressing media corporations’
political speech.”).
Id. at 943–44 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“Like numerous
statutes, [the BCRA] exempts media companies’ news stories, commentaries, and
editorials from its electioneering restrictions, in recognition of the unique role played by
the institutional press in sustaining public debate.” (footnote omitted)).
Id. at 971–75 (defending the antidistortion rationale as support for the BCRA).
Id. at 971–72 (listing a series of characteristics that distinguish individual people from
corporations).
Id. at 975 n.74, 976 (“The majority seems oblivious to the simple truth . . . .”).
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218

have no consciences, no beliefs, no feelings, no thoughts, no desires.” He
argued that corporations “are not themselves members of ‘We the People’
219
by whom and for whom our Constitution was established.”
Further,
corporations are able to amass large amounts of resources in their treasury
“war chests,” but a corporation’s accumulation of capital has very little, if
anything, to do with the political proclivities of its constituents—including
220
investors and customers.
Moreover, because a corporation’s mission is
centered on making profits, any electoral message that might advance that
mission may indeed be antithetical to the political proclivities of the
221
corporation’s constituents.
Because of the power and influence of corporations in our marketplace,
corporations could come to dominate our elections and indeed our
222
democracy. This domination might diminish the inclination of citizens to
223
It may, in fact, leave citizens
feel vested in the political process at all.
(rightly or wrongly) feeling completely disenfranchised and incapable of
224
meaningfully disciplining elected officials.
Justice Stevens was again
caustic with the majority and described the majority’s approach to this
antidistortion rational as “facile” and one that simply “assumes away all of
225
these complexities.”

218
219
220

221

222

223

224

225

Id. at 972.
Id.
Id. at 971 (“The resources in the treasury of a business corporation, furthermore, are not
an indication of popular support for the corporation’s political ideas.” (quoting Austin v.
Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 659 (1990), overruled by Citizens United, 130 S.
Ct., at 913 (internal quotation marks omitted))).
Id. at 974, 977 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“The structure of a
business corporation, furthermore, draws a line between the corporation’s economic
interests and the political preferences of the individuals associated with the corporation;
the corporation must engage the electoral process with the aim ‘to enhance the
profitability of the company, no matter how persuasive the arguments for a broader or
conflicting set of priorities.’” (citations omitted) (quoting Brief of Amicus Curiae
American Independent Business Alliance in Support of Appellee on Supplemental
Question, at 11, Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. 876 (Jul. 31, 2009) (No. 08-205))).
Id. at 974 (“Corporate domination of electioneering can generate the impression that
corporations dominate our democracy.” (citation omitted) (quoting Austin, 494 U.S. at
659) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
Id. (“The predictable result is cynicism and disenchantment: an increased perception
that large spenders ‘call the tune’ and a reduced ‘willingness of voters to take part in
democratic governance.’” (quoting McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 530 U.S. 93, 144
(2003))).
Id. at 974–75 (“[U]nregulated corporate electioneering might diminish the ability of
citizens to ‘hold officials accountable to the people.’” (citing id. at 898 (majority
opinion))).
Id. at 975.
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c. Shareholder Protection
The Citizens United majority also considered a shareholder protection
rationale as being insufficient to support the regulation on corporate
226
speech.
The shareholder protection rationale was partly described above
227
in Justice Stevens’s reaction to the majority’s antidistortion arguments.
Shareholders do not typically invest in corporations to make political
228
statements.
When a corporation then takes general corporate funds to
advance a particular political issue, it is not speaking for its shareholders but
for the officers or directors who made the decision to engage in the political
229
speech.
Thus, restrictions on that type of electioneering in fact protect
shareholders from funding the political interests of their corporation’s
230
managers.
Even assuming that corporate managers are solely acting to
advance the interests of the corporation, the political message still would not
231
reflect the political beliefs of each of the corporation’s shareholders.
The majority dismissed this shareholder protection rationale out of
hand, explaining that such a rationale could again lead to restrictions on the
free speech of media corporations (despite the fact that once again such
232
restrictions were not at stake in this case).
Thus, the Court said, this
slippery slope of permitting such regulations is simply an unacceptable
233
limitation on the free speech enshrined by the First Amendment.

226
227
228

229
230

231
232

233

Id. at 911 (majority opinion) (finding “sufficient” reasons “to reject this shareholderprotection interest”).
Id. at 971, 977 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (explaining the
corporate motivation and obligation to enhance profits).
Id. at 977–78 (noting that there is a governmental interest in safeguarding “individuals
who have paid money into a corporation or union for purposes other than the support of
candidates” (quoting Fed. Election Comm’n v. Nat’l. Right to Work Comm., 459 U.S. 197,
207–09 (1982))).
Cf. id. at 972 (“Perhaps the officers or directors of the corporation have the best claim to
be the ones speaking . . . .”).
Id. at 977 (“Interwoven with Austin’s concern to protect the integrity of the electoral
process is a concern to protect the rights of shareholders from a kind of coerced speech:
electioneering expenditures that do not reflect their support.” (quoting Austin v. Mich.
Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 660–61 (1990), overruled by Citizens United, 130 S.
Ct. at 913) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
Cf. id. (noting that the political speech initiated by corporate directors is likely to be
misaligned with the political preferences of at least some shareholders).
Id. at 911 (majority opinion) (“The Government contends further that corporate
independent expenditures can be limited because of its interest in protecting dissenting
shareholders from being compelled to fund corporate political speech. This asserted
interest, like Austin’s antidistortion rationale, would allow the Government to ban the
political speech even of media corporations.”).
Cf. id. at 905–08 (arguing that a statute that potentially restricts media corporation speech
is unacceptable under the First Amendment).
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The majority continued its argument, saying that the BCRA was both too
234
broad and too narrow to withstand strict scrutiny. The BCRA is too broad
because there are narrower measures the government could have enacted to
protect shareholders from indirectly funding political messages that conflict
235
with their own.
The BCRA is too narrow for at least two reasons. First,
236
media corporations are exempted.
Thus, shareholders in those
237
corporations are left unprotected. Second, the electioneering restrictions
238
are only in effect for certain relatively short timeframes before an election.
If shareholders need protection, then surely they need protection beyond
239
just those limited time periods.
Justice Stevens for the dissent again took on the majority and argued that
the regulation under consideration in this case, the BCRA, in fact
“protect[s] the rights of shareholders from a kind of coerced speech:
240
electioneering expenditures that do not reflect their support.”
Justice
Stevens argued that this shareholder protection rationale was considered
and endorsed by Congress in its enactments that extend back more than a
241
hundred years to the Tillman Act.
Justice Stevens went on to consider the majority’s argument that
corporate democracy should function in a way that already protects the
242
shareholders. If the shareholders do not like the message the corporation
234
235

236

237

238

239
240

241

242

Id. at 911 (concluding that “[the BCRA] is both underinclusive and overinclusive”).
Id. (“[T]he statute is overinclusive because it covers all corporations, including nonprofit
corporations and for-profit corporations with only single shareholders. As to other
corporations, the remedy is not to restrict speech but to consider and explore other
regulatory mechanisms.”).
Id. at 905 (“The media exemption discloses further difficulties with the law now under
consideration. There is no precedent supporting laws that attempt to distinguish
between corporations which are deemed to be exempt as media corporations and those
which are not.”).
Id. at 911 (noting that if “a shareholder of a corporation that owns a newspaper disagrees
with the political views the newspaper expresses,” then under the shareholder protection
rationale, the government would also have “the authority to restrict the media
corporation’s political speech”).
Id. (“[I]f Congress had been seeking to protect dissenting shareholders, it would not have
banned corporate speech in only certain media within 30 or 60 days before an
election.”).
Cf. id. (“A dissenting shareholder’s interests would be implicated by speech in any media
at any time.”).
Id. at 977 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (internal quotation
marks omitted) (quoting Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 660–61
(1990), overruled by Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 913).
Id. (“The concern to protect dissenting shareholders and union members has a long
history in campaign finance reform. It provided a central motivation for the Tillman Act
in 1907 and subsequent legislation.”).
Id. at 978 (addressing the majority’s claim that “abuses of shareholder money can be
corrected ‘through the procedures of corporate democracy’” (quoting id. at 911)
(majority opinion)).
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endorses, they can vote for new management or can simply rely on the “Wall
243
In addition, a
Street Rule” and sell their shares in that corporation.
shareholder could bring a lawsuit against any manager who puts his or her
244
own interests above those of the corporation.
Interestingly, Justice Stevens retorted that the idea of a corporate
245
democracy is a fragile one. Justice Stevens cited recent works of corporate
scholarship to emphasize the reality of the modern investment
246
marketplace.
Most individuals own stock through intermediaries and
247
seldom make individual trades.
Moreover, it is extremely difficult for an
individual to track and identify what corporate electioneering
communications have been made by the corporations that such investor
248
holds. Justice Stevens offered an assessment of the specific mechanisms of
corporate democracy—voting for management and/or bringing suit against
249
management.
He cited to scholars Margaret Blair and Lynn Stout,

243

244

245

246

247

248

249

Id. (concluding that “by ‘corporate democracy,’ presumably the Court means the rights
of shareholders to vote” and acknowledging that shareholders who are dissatisfied with
the independent expenditures being made by a corporation “can divest”).
Id. (examining the ability of shareholders “to bring derivative suits for breach of fiduciary
duty,” which is a component of the majority’s invocation of “corporate democracy”). For
a discussion of how the interests of management and shareholders may significantly
diverge in the area of political speech, and how management decisions in this area will
likely be shielded from any shareholder input like other business decisions, see Lucian A.
Bebchuk & Robert J. Jackson, Jr., Corporate Political Speech: Who Decides?, 124 HARV. L. REV.
83 (2010).
Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 978 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(pointing out that “many corporate lawyers will tell you that ‘these rights [supposedly
included in the concept of corporate democracy] are so limited as to be almost
nonexistent,’ given the internal authority wielded by boards and managers and the
expansive protections afforded by the business judgment rule” (quoting Margaret M.
Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law, 85 VA. L. REV. 247, 320
(1999))).
Id. (citing Blair & Stout, supra note 245, at 298–315, 320; Alicia Davis Evans, A Requiem for
the Retail Investor?, 95 VA. L. REV. 1105, 1117 (2009); Adam Winkler, Beyond Bellotti, 32
LOY. L.A. L. REV. 133, 165–66, 199–200 (1998)).
See id. (“Studies show that a majority of individual investors make no trades at all during a
given year.” (citing Evans, supra note 246, at 1117)); Jennifer S. Taub, Able but Not Willing:
The Failure of Mutual Fund Advisors to Advocate for Shareholders’ Rights, 34 J. CORP. L. 843,
845 (2009) (discussing the separation of beneficial ownership by investors and legal
ownership of corporate shares by intermediaries, and arguing that those intermediaries
typically vote with inside corporate managers and do not typically advocate for
shareholder rights).
Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 978 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(pointing out that, “if the corporation in question operates a PAC, an investor who sees
the company’s ads may not know whether they are being funded through the PAC or
through the general treasury”).
Id. (concluding that “[b]y ‘corporate democracy,’ presumably the Court means the rights
of shareholders to vote and to bring derivtive suits for breach of fiduciary duty”).
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indicating his agreement with them that in this area shareholder “rights are
250
so limited as to be almost nonexistent.”
Other advocates have pointed out the weakness in the market
251
mechanisms that the majority claimed can protect shareholders.
Ann
Yerger, the Executive Director of the Council of Institutional Investors,
testified before a congressional subcommittee after the Citizens United
decision was made. In that testimony, she explained that the members of
her council represent more than three trillion dollars in institutional market
252
investments.
Those investors represent pension and other employee
benefit funds that by design have a long-term passive investment strategy to
253
protect the pensions of their beneficiaries.
Such investors simply are not
likely to exercise the “Wall Street Rule” and sell their shares whenever they
254
are dissatisfied. Ms. Yerger further stated in her testimony that the notion
of corporate democracy in America is an embarrassment and boils down to
little more than shareholders rubber-stamping management’s monopoly on
255
power.
Corporate scholar John Coffee attacked the majority’s reasoning
regarding shareholder protection in testimony before a congressional
committee immediately after the Citizens United decision. In that testimony,
he commented that the majority assumed that shareholders have adequate
256
recourse for unchecked political spending by corporations when in reality,
257
“shareholders are actually very constrained in what they can do.”

250
251

252

253

254

255
256

Id. (quoting Blair & Stout, supra note 245, at 320) (internal quotation marks omitted).
See, e.g., Reza Dibadj, Expressive Rights for Shareholders After Citizens United, 46 U.S.F. L.
REV. 459 (2011) (discussing and dismissing the arguments that: (i) corporate law is
sufficient to protect shareholders; (ii) the Wall Street Rule works; and (iii) constitutional
rights violations may not be claimed against corporations).
Corporate Governance After Citizens United: Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Capital
Markets, Insurance, and Government Sponsored Enterprises of the United States H. Comm. on
Financial Services, 111th Cong. 10 (2010) (statement of Ann Yerger, Executive Director,
Council of Institutional Investors) (“[T]he Council is a nonpartisan association of public,
union, and corporate employee benefit plans with assets exceeding $3 trillion.”).
Id. (explaining that the Council “is a nonpartisan association of public, union, and
corporate employee benefit plans” who are “long-term patient investors due to their
lengthy investment horizons and heavy commitment to passive investment strategies”).
Corporate Governance After Citizens United: Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Capital
Markets, Insurance, and Government Sponsored Enterprises of the United States H. Comm. on
Financial Services, 111th Cong. 91 (2010) (testimony of Ann Yerger, Executive Director,
Council of Institutional Investors) (“Because these passive strategies restrict Council
members from exercising the ‘Wall Street walk’ and selling their shares when they are
dissatisfied, corporate governance issues are of great interest to our members.”).
Id. at 99 (“The current system of rubber stamp voting and management’s monopoly of
the ballot are embarrassingly unworthy of our democracy.”).
Corporate Governance After Citizens United: Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Capital
Markets, Insurance, and Government Sponsored Enterprises of the United States H. Comm. on
Financial Services, 111th Cong. 45 (2010) (testimony of John C. Coffee, Jr., Adolf A. Berle
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Professor Laurence Tribe went as far as to say that “talk of shareholder
258
democracy is largely illusory.” Further, he stated that the problem of
allowing corporate managers to use shareholder assets to advance their own
259
political agenda is “undeniable.”
Finally, other scholars have expressed
concerns that allowing corporate managers to make political contributions
with corporate funds amounts to coercing shareholders to support political
260
speech.
In sum, the Citizens United case represents a turning point in
jurisprudence that is at the intersection of contract, corporate, and
constitutional law. The conservative majority of the Court contravened wellaccepted canons of judicial behavior to take on a facial challenge to a
261
corporate regulation that was not raised by the parties themselves. To the
dismay of the dissent, the majority went on to contravene precedent and
elevate and act on rhetoric instead of a well-considered analysis of the
262
circumstances surrounding the regulation.
Furthermore, the analysis of
the majority lacks any coherent conception of what a corporation is and how
it functions in society. Indeed, the majority seems to ignore prevailing
corporate law scholarship that helps describe what a corporation is, what its
role in society is, and when and how it might be regulated. In the end, the

257
258

259
260

261

262

Professor of Law, Columbia Law School) (“[B]oth the majority and Justice Scalia’s
concurring opinion in Citizen United [sic] assume and state that shareholders have the
power to curb and restrict the use of corporate funds for political or electioneering
purposes.”).
Id.
Tribe, supra note 136 (“To be sure, the statutory and decisional laws of every state already
create theoretical rights in individual shareholders to sue corporate boards under state
law for making ‘wasteful’ expenditures, expenditures that do not advance the
corporation’s interests, but talk of shareholder democracy is largely illusory in a world
where there are countless obstacles to vigilant oversight of corporate management by the
widely dispersed ‘owners’ of the underlying enterprise, especially when most of those
owners have only the most attenuated link to their stock holdings, a link made all the
more tenuous by the fact, noted in the Stevens dissent in Citizens United, that ‘[m]ost
American households that own stock do so through intermediaries such as mutual funds
and pension plans, . . . which makes it more difficult both to monitor and to alter
particular holdings.’” (alteration in original) (quoting Citizens United v. Fed. Election
Comm’n, 130 S. Ct. 876, 978 (2010) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part))).
Id. (“[I]n the context of for-profit, business corporations, that problem is undeniable.”).
See, e.g., Anne Tucker, Flawed Assumptions: A Corporate Law Analysis of Free Speech and
Corporate Personhood in Citizens United, 61 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 497, 499 (2011) (arguing
that “unrestricted corporate political speech poses a risk of compelled speech”).
See Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 979 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(“Today’s decision is backwards in many senses. It elevates the majority’s agenda over the
litigants’ submissions, facial attacks over as-applied claims, broad constitutional theories
over narrow statutory grounds, individual dissenting opinions over precedential holdings,
assertion over tradition, absolutism over empiricism, rhetoric over reality.”).
Id.
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majority achieved a result that portends a much more dominant role of
corporations in the American economy as well as American politics.

II. PART TWO: THE CONTRACTARIAN ANALYSIS
As has just been discussed, the Citizens United decision has empowered
corporations with the constitutional rights of individuals, at least in the
context of campaign finance. The decision is decidedly de-regulatory in
nature. It has established new precedent that will make it more difficult for
legislative bodies to regulate corporations in the future. However, the
majority’s decision established this new precedent while largely ignoring
corporate law scholarship that presents a variety of theories through which
the courts might more appropriately view a corporation and its role in
263
society.
By contrast, Justice Stevens for the dissent seemed to discuss and adopt
264
what has been known as the state entity theory of a corporation. This Part
will more fully examine the state entity theory. It will also highlight what is
arguably the prevailing theory of a corporation: the contractarian’s nexus of
265
contracts theory. Both of these theoretical perspectives lead to a necessary
conclusion that the majority decided Citizens United incorrectly.
Part Two will provide support for future judicial and legislative bodies to
resist the corporate de-regulatory movement represented so starkly by the
Citizens United majority. More generally, this Part will explain how the
contractarian paradigm can provide a framework for courts and legislatures
in the future to set and evaluate appropriate regulations on corporations.

A. The Corporation as a State Entity
Justice Stevens referred specifically to the state entity theory of the firm
266
in a footnote in his dissent. Ironically, there he explained that his analysis
of the Citizens United case does not depend specifically on accepting one or

263
264

265

266

For examples of that corporate law scholarship, see supra text accompanying note 9.
See Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 930 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(distinguishing corporations from natural people and arguing that “[t]he conceit that
corporations must be treated identically to natural persons in the political sphere is not
only inaccurate but also inadequate to justify the Court’s disposition of this case”).
Although this Part focuses on the state entity and contractarian theories, there are other
theories of the corporation that have significant support. One of those is the team
production model, which discusses a corporation as a team of resources that work
together to produce a profit. The focus of that model is then how to divide the profits.
See Blair & Stout, supra note 245.
Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 971 n.72 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
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267

however, his
another of the prevailing theories of a corporation;
description of a corporation coincided directly with the state entity theory
268
(also known as the artificial entity theory or the concession theory).
Justice Stevens characterized this theory as conceptualizing a corporation
269
as “a grantee of a state concession.”
Justice Stevens pointed out that the
Austin case, discussed above, described the firm as a grantee of concessions
270
from the state (and upheld the restrictions on corporate electioneering).
This state entity theory essentially posits that because corporations are
created by the state (i.e. given a concession to exist and engage in certain
271
activities), the state should have the right to regulate them.
The view of a corporation offered by proponents of the state entity
theory matches the description of a corporation that Justice Stevens put
272
forth in his dissent.
Justice Stevens framed his description of the
273
corporation with a historical perspective. As Justice Stevens detailed, only
274
a few hundred corporations existed when the Constitution was written.
Unlike today, however, early incorporations were created by individual acts

267

268

269
270

271

272

273
274

Id. (“Nothing in this analysis turns on whether the corporation is conceptualized as a
grantee of a state concession, a nexus of explicit and implicit contracts, a mediated
hierarchy of stakeholders, or any other recognized model.” (citations omitted)).
He specifically cites to the state entity theory (also known as the artificial entity or the
concession theory), the nexus of contracts theory, and the team production theory
(which will not be discussed in this Article, as it has been overtaken by the nexus of
contracts theory as the prevailing paradigm through which current corporate law scholars
view and discuss the firm). Id. (“Nothing in this analysis turns on whether the
corporation is conceptualized as a grantee of a state concession, a nexus of explicit and
implicit contracts, a mediated hierarchy of stakeholders, or any other recognized model.”
(internal citations omitted)).
Id. (citing Trs. of Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. 518, 636 (1819)).
Id. (“Austin referred to the structure and the advantages of corporations as ‘stateconferred’ in several places.” (citing Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S.
652, 660, 665, 667 (1990), overruled by Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 913)).
See William W. Bratton, Jr., The New Economic Theory of the Firm: Critical Perspectives from
History, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1471, 1475 (1989) (“Concession theory [also known as state
entity theory] comes in degrees. A strong version attributes the corporation’s very
existence to state sponsorship. A weaker version sets up state permission as a regulatory
prerequisite to doing business.” (footnote omitted)); see also David Millon, Theories of the
Corporation, 1990 DUKE L.J. 201, 206–11 (1990) (“The corporate entity was considered
artificial, in the sense that the corporation owed its existence to the positive law of the
state rather than to the private initiative of individual incorporators.”).
Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 947–51 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(“Corporations were created, supervised, and conceptualized as quasi-public entities,
‘designed to serve a social function for the state.’” (quoting Oscar Handlin & Mary F.
Handlin, Origins of the American Business Corporation, 5 J. ECON. HIST. 1, 22 (1945))).
Id. at 949–50 (“The Framers thus took it as a given that corporations could be
comprehensively regulated in the service of the public welfare.”).
Id. at 949 n.53 (“Scholars have found that only a handful of business corporations were
issued charters during the colonial period, and only a few hundred during all of the 18th
century.”).
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275

of the legislature. A corporation had to obtain legislative approval to exist
and act in any way whatsoever. This individualized method of state
authorization to act betrays an early mistrust of corporations.
Justice Stevens quotes a variety of early jurists and commentators in
describing corporations as “soulless” and capable of encouraging “the worst
276
urges of whole groups of men.”
Early corporations would petition the
state for a charter and would limit themselves to certain very specific
277
activities in order to gain the approval of the state for their charter.
Any
activity that went beyond the stated purpose was considered ultra vires, or
beyond that corporation’s power.
States began to charter corporations because of the corporation’s unique
ability to aggregate resources and accomplish tasks that might have been
278
difficult or impossible otherwise.
States grant the shareholders of
corporations the privilege of limited liability, making corporations an
extremely attractive vehicle for the aggregation and deployment of large
279
amounts of invested resources. Shareholders risk only the amount of their
investment, and any further debts of the corporation are discharged solely
with corporate assets.
Professor Reuven Avi-Yonah traces the state entity theory to the
280
281
landmark Dartmouth College case, decided in 1819.
In that case, Chief
Justice Marshall considered what a corporate charter really signified. Was it
merely a contract with the state, or did it give the state the power to take

275
276
277

278

279
280
281

See Millon, supra note 271, at 206 (describing “the practice of requiring a special act of
the state legislature for each instance of incorporation”).
Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 949 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(citing FRIEDMAN, supra note 86, at 194).
Interestingly, early corporations in America often had a public function. So, for example,
early corporations involved activities like banking, insurance, and the building and
maintaining of public utilities. See generally JAMES WILLARD HURST, THE LEGITIMACY OF
THE BUSINESS CORPORATION IN THE LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 1780–1970, at 17 (1970)
(“From the 1780’s well into mid-nineteenth century the most frequent and conspicuous
use of the business corporation . . . was for one particular type of enterprise, that which
we later called public utility and put under particular regulation because of its special
impact in the community.”).
Id. at 20 (discussing the emergence of the corporate form, and explaining that only
through the legal grant of the corporate charter were corporations then authorized to
“use assets or exact payments or impose burdens on others in ways which would have
been either impracticable or illegal or both without the law’s specific sanction”).
Id. at 27–28 (discussing the value of the limitation on liability that the corporate form
affords its shareholders).
Trs. of Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. 518 (1819) (discussing the validity of
corporate charters granted by the British government after the Revolutionary War).
Avi-Yonah, supra note 9, at 1005 (“These opinions represent the evolution of [Chief
Justice Marshall’s] thinking on corporations, which moved from the aggregate view . . . to
the artificial entity view, [articulated in] Dartmouth College . . . .”).
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282

Justice Marshall stated that a corporation “is
control of the corporation?
an artificial being, invisible, intangible, and existing only in contemplation
283
of law.” While a state could not take over a corporation, Justice Marshall’s
284
view of the corporation “left ample room for state regulation.”
Today, corporations do not need to seek specific legislative action to
incorporate. Instead, general incorporation statutes allow parties to form
285
corporations, typically electronically, within hours, if not minutes.
And
corporate activities are not typically restricted as they used to be. Most
corporations are incorporated to pursue any legal purpose, dispensing with
286
the notion that a corporation might be acting ultra vires.
Nonetheless, proponents of the state entity theory hold that, by enacting
general incorporation statutes, states are allowing corporations to come into
existence and act as legal persons. Corporations are granted a fictional birth
when they are incorporated and at that moment become a fictional legal
person with certain rights and privileges. Proponents of the state entity
theory believe that the state should have the ability to limit the rights and
privileges it grants to corporations if doing so would advance the interests of
287
the political community within which the corporation operates.
The state entity or concession theory of a corporation has had varying
degrees of prominence over the years. Over the past thirty years, the neoclassical economic view of a corporation as a nexus of contracts (the

282
283
284

285

286

287

In that case, New Hampshire had attempted to take over Dartmouth by taking control
over the appointment of the trustees of the college. Woodward, 17 U.S. at 518–25.
Id. at 636.
Avi-Yonah, supra note 9, at 1007 (“[T]he emphasis on the artificial nature of the
corporation left ample room for state regulation via the original charter.”). Note that
Professor Avi-Yonah goes on to argue his view that understanding a corporation as a real
entity and not just an artificial entity is actually more fitting. Id. at 1032 (concluding that
one of the reasons for the prevalence of the real entity view is that it “fits reality much
more” than either the artificial entity view or the aggregate view).
For an example, see Florida’s Sunbiz website, which allows for electronic incorporation,
and Delaware’s incorporation procedures, which allow for incorporation by fax of all of
the relevant documents. Electionic Filing & Certification, FLA. DEP’T OF STATE DIV. OF
CORPS., https://efile.sunbiz.org/onlmenu.html (last visited Dec. 19, 2012); How to Form a
New
Business
Entity,
DEL.
DEP’T
OF
STATE:
DIV.
OF
CORPS.,
http://corp.delaware.gov/howtoform.shtml (last updated Nov. 14, 2012).
For an example, see Delaware’s corporate law, which states that “[a] corporation may be
incorporated or organized under this chapter to conduct or promote any lawful business
or purposes, except as may otherwise be provided by the Constitution or other law of this
State.” Del. Code Ann. tit. 8 § 101(b).
Cf. Avi-Yonah, supra note 9, at 1001 (describing the artificial entity theory’s understanding
of a corporation as “a creature of the State”); see also Millon, supra note 271, at 211
(“[T]he idea of the corporation as an artificial creature of the state provided the
theoretical basis for a body of corporate law that explicitly addressed the relationship
between corporate activity and public welfare.”).
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288

contractarian paradigm) has taken center stage. However, the state entity
theory still has traction, as indicated by the Citizens United dissent itself, in
which Justice Stevens’s description of a corporation coincides with a view of
the corporation as a grantee of state concessions.
Most recently, Professor Sale has made a call for public corporations to
be viewed in a new public way that focuses on those corporations as the
product of a variety of forces exerted throughout society, including the
289
media, the internet, and the state. Professor Sale does not couch her new
call in the traditional theory of the firm as a state entity. Nonetheless, she
echoes that theory when she argues that public corporations are now, less
than ever before, about private orderings with an increasing regulatory role
290
being exerted by the state.
The implications of the state entity theory for the regulatory
environment are clear.
Government regulation of corporations is
appropriate and should be designed to optimize the role of corporations in
society. In accord with this theory, the BCRA would be seen as an entirely
legitimate and permissible act by the government.
The Citizens United case echoed Austin when it discussed a threefold
purpose behind the type of campaign finance regulation at stake: to
(i) reduce corruption in politics; (ii) reduce distortion corporations might
cause in the political process; and (iii) prevent use of shareholder assets to
support political candidates whom the shareholders do not support
291
personally.
Any of those rationales would be sufficient justifications for
the BCRA in the eyes of a proponent of the state entity theory.
Indeed, Justice Stevens came to the same conclusion in his dissent: that
292
the BCRA was entirely constitutional.
This state entity theory empowers
the corporation only to the extent that the legislature sees appropriate. It
does not and would not easily allow a corporation to trump the interests of
288

289

290
291

292

See Bainbridge, supra note 92, at 859 (arguing that the economic theory of the firm has
taken over all serious corporate law scholarship and, in a particularly aggressive
characterization of that predominance, proclaiming that the debate over whether the
economic view should predominate is “over”).
Sale, supra note 93, at 138 (positing that a “theory of the corporation that operates in a
public sphere” and “a need for change in the way that officers and directors understand
and do their jobs” are the necessary results of the fact that “the government and the
media have increasing influence over public corporations and their governance”).
Id. at 148 (arguing that, as a result of recent corporate scandals, more government
regulation of corporations is likely).
Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 130 S. Ct. 876, 903 (2010) (evaluating in turn
the three considerations the FEC argued were compelling interests supporting the BCRA:
“the antidistortion rationale on which Austin and its progeny rest in part,” “an
anticorruption interest,” and “a shareholder-protection interest” (citing Austin v. Mich.
Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 674–75, 678 (1990) (Brennan, J., concurring),
overruled by Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 913)).
Id. at 979 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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the government that created it. Instead, proponents of this theory empower
the government with the right to regulate the corporation.

B. The Contractarian Paradigm
The nexus of contracts theory of the corporation stands in contrast to
the state entity theory. This theory began to be discussed actively in the
293
1980s.
It has grown in popularity to become the leading economic
perspective on the corporation and is now more generally the predominant
294
theory of corporations discussed by corporate scholars.

1. The Corporation as a Nexus of Contracts
Like the state entity theorists, so-called contractarians acknowledge that
a corporation comes into being when a state grants that corporation its
charter. However, these theorists characterize the chartering act differently
than the state entity proponents. Contractarians give the act of chartering
much less significance, viewing it simply as the state witnessing the
emergence of an organization that involves a private ordering among a
variety of constituents. Indeed, contractarians view the corporation as a
nexus or a hub of privately structured contractual arrangements among all
295
of those constituents.
The constituents of a corporation include the
corporation’s shareholders, managers, customers, suppliers, employees,
service providers, creditors, and even arguably the community within which
296
the corporation is located.
This contractarian view of the firm is built on the fundamental notion,
297
arguably embedded in the U.S. Constitution, that individuals should have

293

294
295
296
297

The notion of a corporation being viewed as a nexus of contracts was introduced in
Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency
Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 311 (1976) (“The private corporation or
firm is simply one form of legal fiction which serves as a nexus for contracting
relationships . . . .”).
See Bainbridge, supra note 91, at 859.
Jensen & Meckling, supra note 293, at 311 (“The private corporation or firm is simply one
form of legal fiction which serves as a nexus for contracting relationships . . . .”).
Id. at 310 (“Contractual relations are the essence of the firm, not only with employees but
with suppliers, customers, creditors, etc..”).
There is a long history of finding the liberty of contract within the U.S. Constitution.
Most notably, there is the provision in Article I, § 10 stating that no State “shall . . . pass
any . . . Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts.” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10. Moreover,
the Fourteenth Amendment’s liberty provision has been interpreted by a long line of
cases as providing for economic liberty. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (stating that no
state shall “deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law”).
The most infamous case to divine a liberty of contract right from this provision was
Lochner v. New York. 198 U.S. 45, 53 (1905) (“The general right to make a contract in
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the liberty of contract to structure their own arrangements without the
298
This notion, of course, is where
undue interference of the government.
the contractarians diverge from the state entity theorists. While the state
entity proponents argue that whatever the state creates it can regulate, the
contractarians argue that the state’s role should be limited to enforcing and
policing the privately structured contracts that create and sustain the
299
corporation.
So, for example, an employee of a corporation strikes a bargain—i.e.
enters a contract—with the corporation when both parties agree to certain
terms of employment. Creditors likewise enter into certain agreements with
a corporation to provide financing in accord with certain contractual terms.
And shareholders should understand that they are getting a bundle of rights
300
with respect to that corporation in exchange for the money they invest.
Contractarians would argue that all of these parties should strike the
bargain they find acceptable and live within the terms of that bargain, or
else they will find themselves in breach and possibly subject to legal recourse
from their counterparties. Again, the traditional contractarian argument is
that there is no compelling need for government regulation or oversight
301
beyond the policing and enforcement of the contractual bargains.

2. Constitutional Support for Liberty of Contract
This liberty of contract idea finds its source in the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments to the Constitution. Both provisions discuss the primacy of an

298

299

300

301

relation to his business is part of the liberty of the individual protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment of the Federal Constitution.”).
See, e.g., FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF
CORPORATE LAW 15, 22–23 (1991) (asserting that justifications for intervention by the
state are not applicable to “intra-corporate affairs”); Roberta Romano, Answering the
Wrong Question: The Tenuous Case for Mandatory Corporate Law, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1599
(1989) (discussing the permissive nature of corporate law, which allows parties to
structure their own contracts freely).
Bainbridge, supra note 91, at 860 (“Contractarians contend that corporate law is generally
comprised of default rules, from which shareholders are free to depart, rather than
mandatory rules.”).
This notion of limited government regulation of corporations underscores the fact that
many corporate laws are default laws, which allow parties to opt out of their application.
See, e.g., Elaine A. Welle, Freedom of Contract and the Securities Laws: Opting Out of Securities
Regulation by Private Agreement, 56 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 519, 526–27 (1999) (describing
statutes adopted by some jurisdictions that allow shareholders to contract out of common
law constraints and adopt different fiduciary standards).
For more discussion of this notion that corporate regulation should be at a minimum, see
Bernard S. Black, Is Corporate Law Trivial?: A Political and Economic Analysis, 84 NW. U. L.
REV. 542 (1990).
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individual’s liberty, stating that the government shall not “deprive” an
302
individual of “liberty . . . without due process of law.”
Dating back to the late 1800s, federal case law interpreted those clauses
to indicate that all individuals must have the liberty to structure their lives
and their business dealings as they deem proper, and to enter into contracts
to effectuate those arrangements. The earliest federal case to discuss this
303
liberty of contract notion was Allgeyer v. Louisiana.
In that case, Justice
Peckham made the now-famous statement that:
The liberty mentioned in [the Fourteenth Amendment] means not only
the right of the citizen to be free from the mere physical restraint of his
person, as by incarceration, but the term is deemed to embrace the right
of the citizen to be free in the enjoyment of all his faculties, to be free to
use them in all lawful ways, to live and work where he will, to earn his
livelihood by any lawful calling, to pursue any livelihood or avocation,
and for that purpose to enter into all contracts which may be proper,
304
necessary, and essential to carrying out . . . [those] purposes . . . .

The most notorious case for enshrining this notion of a liberty of
305
contract is Lochner v. New York, decided in the early 1900s.
In that case, a
state statute that regulated the working hours for bakers was challenged as
violating the liberty of contract interest enshrined by the Fourteenth
306
Amendment.
The Supreme Court found that the liberty interest was
paramount and struck down the statute for impinging on the individuals’
307
rights to structure their working arrangements as they saw fit.
The Lochner case was later demonized as a perfect example of judicial
activism, with the Justices enforcing their own libertarian preferences for a
laissez-faire economy, contrary to the policies that certain legislatives bodies
308
were enacting.
Cases decided just a few decades after Lochner would

302
303

304
305
306
307

308

U.S. CONST. amend. V; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
165 U.S. 578 (1897) (striking down as unconstitutional a Louisiana regulation that made
it criminal to enter into an insurance contract with an out-of-state insurer that did not
comply with Louisiana law).
Id. at 589.
198 U.S. 45 (1905).
Id. at 53.
Id. at 57 (“The question whether this act is valid as a labor law, pure and simple, may be
dismissed in a few words. There is no reasonable ground for interfering with the liberty
of person or the right of free contract, by determining the hours of labor, in the
occupation of a baker.”).
Justice Holmes wrote the dissent and described the majority opinion as promoting a
laissez-faire political and economic agenda. Id. at 75 (Holmes, J., dissenting) (“This case
is decided upon an economic theory which a large part of the country does not
entertain.”). Other scholars have seized on that dissent to decry the opinion as judicial
activism at its worst. See, e.g., David N. Mayer, The Myth of “Laissez-Faire Constitutionalism”:
Liberty of Contract During the Lochner Era, 36 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 217, 218–19 (2009)
(referring to the decision as an “egregious instance of judicial activism” and explaining
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question what this liberty of contract was and where was it found in the
309
Moreover, faced with the Great Depression and pressure
Constitution.
from the executive branch, the judiciary in the 1930s and 1940s routinely
310
upheld statutes regulating the workplace
in contravention of the
precedent set by the Lochner case.
Despite the Lochnerian tradition falling out of favor, corporate
contractarians today still espouse the notion that the constituents of a
corporation should be given the liberty of contract to structure their
business as they see fit, without undue government interference. However,
as I have argued elsewhere, the logical application of the Lochnerian liberty
311
of contract is not a libertarian utopia free of government regulation.
On
the contrary, if the government has sufficient reason for asserting a
regulation, then the liberty of contract can be limited. Therefore, a
contractarian view of the corporation is compatible with and supportive of
312
government regulation, where the regulation has sufficient justification.
As the Lochner case itself explained, the liberty of contract found in the
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution is not without
313
limits.
If government regulation is “fair, reasonable, and appropriate”
314
then the regulation should withstand constitutional scrutiny.
So, for
example, in Lochner, the Supreme Court examined whether there was an
315
important reason for regulating the working hours of bakers.
The

309

310
311

312

313

314
315

that constitutional law casebooks, legal history textbooks, commentaries written by
conservatives and liberals, and opinions by Supreme Court justices all share this view).
For example, the Court asked in West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, “What is this freedom?
The Constitution does not speak of freedom of contract. It speaks of liberty . . . .” 300
U.S. 379, 391 (1937).
See, e.g., United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938) (upholding a statute
prohibiting the shipment of filled milk in interstate commerce).
See Joseph F. Morrissey, A Contractarian Defense of Corporate Regulation, 11 TRANSACTIONS:
TENN. J. BUS. L. 135, 136 (2009) (disagreeing with the contractarian view that “because
corporations involve nothing more than private contractual orderings among various
parties, there should be little or no meaningful regulation to impinge on those parties’
liberty to contract as they see fit”).
For a slightly different application of this idea, see Benjamin Means, A Contractual
Approach to Shareholder Oppression Law, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 1161, 1161 (2010) (arguing
that regulation of corporations is compatible with a contractarian approach to
corporations because the state is thereby enforcing “implicit contractual obligations of
good faith and fair dealing”).
See Lochner, 198 U.S. at 53–56 (explaining that the state has the power to prevent
individuals from making certain kinds of contracts, but that there is also a limit to the
exercise of the police power by the state).
Id. at 56.
Id. at 58–64.
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majority of that Court found none and thus the Court struck down the
316
regulation.
The dissent, however, argued vociferously that there was ample evidence
of harsh working conditions in the baking industry and that bakers were
being subjected to unhealthy conditions: “Nearly all bakers are pale-faced
and of more delicate health than the workers of other crafts, which is chiefly
317
due to their hard work and their irregular and unnatural mode of living.”
The standard the Lochner majority set up for finding a regulation
constitutional could have easily been met had the majority agreed with the
dissent’s reasoning.

3. Modern Contract Law Jurisprudence Justifies Regulation
The liberty of contract notion is premised on the assumption that parties
freely enter into bargains and that the resulting contracts should be upheld
and not subject to interference or regulation by the government. As is fairly
easy to imagine in the Lochnerian example of harsh working conditions for
bakers in the early 1900s, it is frequently the case that parties do not have
318
equal bargaining power and that resulting bargains are not freely struck.
Modern principles of contract law acknowledge the potential for defects
in the contracting process and for resulting inequitable bargains. Among
the doctrinal defenses to the enforcement of a contract are: incapacity,
mistake, fraud, misrepresentation, duress, unconscionability, and lack of
319
good faith and fair dealing.
Often, entire categories of contracts (like
employment agreements with bakers in the early 1900s) are plagued by any
of the above-named defenses. Since the assumption that parties freely and
fairly enter into contracts is therefore often not true, the maxim that
government regulation should be limited becomes fallacious.
If a contract is challenged in court after it has been made (i.e. ex post),
the successful application of any of those contract law defenses just
mentioned may lead to the contract being unenforceable. It is therefore my
argument that if the government can show that there is a likelihood for a
category of contracts to be infected by some such defect, then government
316

317
318
319

Id. at 64 (“It is manifest to us that the limitation of the hours of labor as provided for in
this section of the statute under which the indictment was found, and the plaintiff in
error convicted, has no such direct relation to, and no such substantial effect upon the
health of the employé, as to justify us in regarding the section as really a health law. . . .
Under such circumstances the freedom of master and employé to contract with each
other in relation to their employment, and in defining the same, cannot be prohibited or
interfered with, without violating the Federal Constitution.”).
Id. at 70.
For a more thorough discussion of this point, see Joseph F. Morrissey, Lochner,
Lawrence, and Liberty, 27 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 609, 654–55 (2011).
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONTRACTS §§ 12, 151–58, 159–73, 174–77, 205, 208 (1981).
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can justify regulation in that area in advance (i.e. ex ante). Not only is such
regulation justifiable, it is also prudent and should be encouraged.

4. The Contractarian Paradigm as an Assessment Tool
As has just been discussed, the contractarian paradigm can be used to
assess whether and when corporate regulation is appropriate. When
applying the contractarian paradigm, a distinction needs to be drawn
between whether a proposed regulation is constitutional and whether the
proposed regulation is prudent.
The constitutional hurdle is perhaps the easier of the two to meet, but
may be more difficult to understand conceptually. Any regulation must first
be justified constitutionally as a legitimate exercise of legislative power, and
second must not offend any other provision of the Constitution. As the
Commerce Clause will provide the most likely justification for a federal
corporate regulation, so the first prong of the constitutional analysis likely
320
will not prove controversial.
However, even if the federal government has the authority to enact a
statute, it is constitutionally forbidden from violating any other provision of
321
the Constitution.
Under the contractarian paradigm, the constitutional
interest at stake is not the corporation’s free speech right, as the majority in
Citizens United decided, but the corporate constituents’ liberty of contract to
enter into any bargain deemed appropriate.
Constitutionally, the
government should be allowed to intrude on that liberty interest only if
there is a sufficient reason. The liberty of contract cases from the Lochner
era used broad language that suggest a regulation is constitutional when it is
322
“fair, reasonable, and appropriate.”
Under today’s jurisprudential tests applied to the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments’ Due Process Clauses, the Court uses three levels of scrutiny to
assess whether those clauses of the Constitution are offended: rational basis,
323
intermediate scrutiny, and strict scrutiny.
Where a Fifth or Fourteenth
Amendment right is not deemed fundamental, rational basis review is used
320

321

322
323

For a general discussion of the current state of Commerce Clause jurisprudence in the
United States, see Gonzalez v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 2 (2005) (holding that “Congress’
Commerce Clause authority includes the power to prohibit the local cultivation and use
of marijuana in compliance with California law”).
For a general discussion of this idea, see Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 2 (1967) (holding
that a statutory scheme adopted by Virginia to prevent marriages between persons on the
basis of race was inconsistent with and violated the Equal Protection and Due Process
Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment).
Lochner, 198 U.S. at 56.
See, e.g., United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 567 (1996) (describing the three tests
available to evaluate an Equal Protection claim); Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S.
214, 216 (1944) (employing strict scrutiny).
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If
and regulations prevail if they are adopted for some rational purpose.
courts apply the three levels of scrutiny to the liberty of contract interest,
325
that interest will likely receive only rational basis review.
Using this contractarian paradigm, then, regulations that intrude on the
liberty of contract of the parties involved will pass the rational basis review
and be deemed constitutional when there is any rational purpose for the
statute. Correcting for systematic defects in the contracts being regulated
would surely qualify as a rational purpose. Thus, regulations adopted after
application of the contractarian paradigm are likely to be constitutional
(assuming they are not discriminatory and do not otherwise offend the
Constitution).
The second question is whether a particular regulation is prudent under
the contractarian paradigm. Those prudential decisions are not fraught
with the jurisprudential complexity of a constitutional analysis, but are likely
to be complex policy questions. Those questions should be left for
326
legislators to answer.
The contractarian paradigm can help legislators
craft appropriate policies.
In assessing the appropriateness of any regulation, the starting point for
the contractarian is a liberty of contract position. That position begins with
an assumption that the parties to transactions relating to the corporation
(those in the nexus of contracts) should be free of regulation. This means
that the liberty of contract enjoyed by the parties to the transaction should
be honored and preserved to allow those parties to achieve the results they
deem appropriate. In economic terms, it allows parties to maximize their
own value or utility from each transaction.
However, it is my argument that even for the contractarian, that
presumption in favor of the autonomy of the parties and against
government regulation must shift when the contracts involved are subject to

324

325
326

The jurisprudential framework for analyzing constitutional rights under the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments dates back to United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144
(1938), which argued that the judiciary should generally defer to the legislative branch
unless there is a fundamental right involved or invidious discrimination against a group
needing judicial protection.
However, for example, a contract relating to child custody may implicate a fundamental
right that triggers a heightened level of scrutiny for government regulation.
See Jeffery Rosen, The Supreme Court: Judicial Temperament and the Democratic Ideal, 47
WASHBURN L.J. 1, 3 (2007) (holding up Chief Justice John Marshall as a model of judicial
restraint, and comparing him in this regard to current Chief Justice John Roberts).
Roberts himself has repeatedly used the metaphor that judges are meant to act as umpire
and only call the balls and the strikes. See, e.g., Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of
John G. Roberts, Jr. to be Chief Justice of the United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 109th Cong. 56 (2005) (statement of John G. Roberts, Jr., nominee, C.J. of the
U.S. Supreme Court) (“I will remember that it’s my job to call balls and strikes, and not
to pitch or bat.”).
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an applicable jurisprudential defense against enforceability. In other words,
the presumption would shift when the enforceability of those contracts
could be successfully challenged with contract law jurisprudence through ex
post litigation, i.e. litigation that occurs after the contract has been struck.
This is where contract law jurisprudence is instructive. Any contracts that as
a class would trigger any of the defenses to contract enforcement ex post are
thereby defective ex ante. It follows that those contracts are in need of
regulation to redress those deficiencies. Included among those defenses are
fraud, misrepresentation, duress, unconscionability, and lack of good faith
327
and fair dealing.
Courts can and should intervene to opine on the constitutionality of a
regulation. However, beyond the constitutional decision, it is for the
legislature to craft and adopt regulations that might best redress the
contracting flaws involved in any category of transaction being regulated.
For those determinations, the elected legislative body is best suited to find
the most prudent regulatory solutions.

C. A Contractarian View of Citizens United
In accord with the nexus of contracts paradigm, the Citizens United case
likely would have had the opposite outcome, finding the electioneering
regulation both constitutional and appropriate. As discussed by both the
majority and the dissent in Citizens United, one argument put forth to uphold
328
the electioneering regulation was the shareholder protection rationale. In
the contractarian framework, this argument is stronger as an argument to
support and enforce the bargain, or the contract, that the shareholders
strike with a corporation when the shareholder makes a decision to buy
stock in that company.
This contract or bargain is often not a contract with the corporation in
the legal sense, since many shareholders buy stock in the securities markets,
long after the company itself has sold the stock. In most cases, the company
is not technically a party to the bargain. As was discussed, critics of the
nexus of contracts model would point to this fact to argue that the
329
contractarian paradigm does not apply at all in these cases.

327
328
329

See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONTRACTS §§ 12, 151–58, 159–73, 174–77, 205, 208 (1981).
Compare Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 130 S. Ct. 876, 911 (2010) (majority
opinion) with id. at 977–79 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
See, e.g., Grant M. Hayden & Matthew T. Bodie, The Uncorporation and the Unraveling of
“Nexus of Contracts” Theory, 109 MICH. L. REV. 1127, 1134 (2011) (reviewing LARRY E.
RIBSTEIN, THE RISE OF THE UNCORPORATION (2010)) (discussing the notion that the
nexus of contracts theory is meant to be an instructive metaphor, but lampooning it for
use that is sometimes seemingly meant to be a description of reality, and sometimes a
metaphor). In their article, Hayden and Bodie critique a book by Professor Larry
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That criticism misses the point. The paradigm is instructive because it
helps assess what the constituents of a corporation expect to get from their
connection with the corporation. Putting aside the legal realist argument
that there is often not a specific bargain with the corporation, the paradigm
still allows analysts to assess whether government regulation might be
warranted, or even constitutional.
Even if the Citizens United majority was correct to address the facial
constitutionality of the BCRA, it was wrong to conclude that it was
unconstitutional. As mentioned above, because the contractarian paradigm
treats corporations as nothing more than a nexus of contracts among its
constituents, it is a mistake to conclude that a corporation should be given
the First Amendment protection given to individuals.
Instead, the constitutional analysis would have focused on, first, whether
Congress had the constitutional authority to pass the statute, and, second,
whether the statute offended any other provision of the Constitution. With
respect to the first question, Congress surely had the power under the
Commerce Clause to regulate corporations doing business in interstate
commerce. With respect to the second question, the Court might have
questioned whether the regulation unconstitutionally impinged on
shareholders’ liberty of contract interest to invest in corporations without
government interference or regulation. Because that interest is likely to get
only rational basis review, any rational basis for the statute would allow it to
pass constitutional muster. Specifically, protecting shareholders from
managers using corporate funds to promote their own political agenda
would be a sufficient rational basis for the BCRA. Moreover, the BCRA also
was designed to decrease corruption in the political process. Again, that is
more than sufficient to form a rational basis for the regulation.
In addition to aiding courts in assessing the constitutionality of corporate
regulations, the contractarian paradigm can also be useful to legislators.
Using the BCRA as an illustration, legislators might have begun their
analysis with a starting point that allows investors freedom to contract with a
corporation with no government interference or regulation. However, the
presumption in favor of liberty of contract and the absence of regulation
would shift in this case after observing that corporate electioneering is not
likely to be a part of the implied bargain shareholders believe they are
striking when they invest in a corporation. Indeed, allowing corporate
electioneering might result in implying a bargain between shareholders and
the corporation that could be deemed unconscionable.
Ribstein that argues that, in contrast to other business entities, the corporation is actually
a very inflexible creature of the regulatory world and not at all merely a creature of
contract. Id. at 1128–29. In light of this argument, they attempt to pronounce the nexus
of contract theory dead, or at least gasping for its last breath. Id. at 1134.
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The doctrine of unconscionability requires that the process of the
bargain be flawed in some way and that the results themselves involve some
330
Here, the bargaining process involving the sale
sense of gross unfairness.
of stock could be said to be flawed by something approaching fraud. An
investor in a company typically views that investment as a bargain that the
target company will attempt to maximize profits, while balancing the
interests of its constituents. Unbridled participation in politics by the
corporation has never been a part of that bargain. Thus, the investor might
be lured into the investment, hoping for profits, while unwittingly
supporting political candidates that are unacceptable to that investor. That
result could surely be said to be grossly unfair, satisfying the second
requirement for a contract to be unconscionable. Because stock purchases
across the board could be said to involve this element of unconscionability, a
contractarian analysis would conclude that regulation in this area is not only
constitutional, but that it is also appropriate. Of course, the exact design of
the regulation is left to Congress.
The conclusion that investors do not imagine corporate involvement in
politics in their bargain could seem controversial to some. Indeed, the
argument could be made that the shareholder bargain does involve giving
unbridled discretion to corporate management to do whatever it deems to
be in the best interests of the corporation.
However, that argument goes too far. In part, the response to that
argument involves some deference to history and tradition. As both the
majority and the dissent in the Citizens United case acknowledge, corporate
involvement in politics has been regulated for more than one hundred
331
years. Further, dating back earlier than that, corporations were specifically
and individually chartered by the state to engage in certain limited and
332
authorized activities.
That history forms the backdrop for investors’
perspectives on the bargain struck when purchasing stock in a corporation.
Investors expect there to be limits on what a corporation can do, and
specifically limits in the area of political spending.
Another retort might be that a new unregulated era is now at hand, and
investors now will know that corporate electioneering is unregulated.
Investors can choose to sell their stock if they are not comfortable with that
situation. Or investors can choose not to invest in the first place,
understanding that corporations are now allowed to use treasury funds to
support or oppose political candidates.

330
331
332

See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONTRACTS § 208 (1981).
Compare Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 925–28 (Scalia, J., concurring) with id. at 948–51
(Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
See supra text accompanying note 78.
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But even if the expectation of limited corporate involvement in politics
did not exist, an unregulated ability for corporations to finance political
campaigns runs against the shareholders’ interests because it diverts funds
333
The primary reason shareholders invest
from profitmaking into politics.
in stock is profit. In fact, recent studies have concluded that corporations
have not been able to show a positive correlation between support for
334
political candidates and profitability.
Moreover, the temptation for corporate managers to support the
candidates of their choosing and disguise that personal support as support
that is in the best interests of the corporation runs contrary to the
fundamental bargain of the shareholder. Conflict of interest transactions
335
are prohibited under every state’s corporate law. However, policing those
conflicted transactions in the area of electioneering would be almost
impossible. All management needs to do to justify electioneering is simply
argue that the political support was in the best interest of the company.
Given the complexity and variety of positions taken by any given politician, it
would be almost impossible to overcome management’s claim in support of
any such transactions. Thus, again, a contractarian would argue that
limiting those conflict of interest transactions ex ante simply supports and
ensures the sanctity of the bargain the shareholders expect in the first place.
In this Part, I have discussed and described the leading theories that
help scholars and policymakers understand corporations and their role in
society. The state entity theory seems to have been described by the dissent
333

334

335

See Anne Tucker, Rational Coercion: Citizens United and a Modern Day Prisoner’s Dilemma,
27 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 1105, 1106 (2011) (arguing that as a result of Citizens United,
corporations will be coerced into donating more and more money to politics, and that
since many corporations will be similarly coerced, any profitability of the donations will
not increase with the increased donations, and that the results instead may be a harmful
inefficient allocation of resources).
See, e.g., CIARA TORRES-SPELLISCY, CORPORATE CAMPAIGN SPENDING:
GIVING
SHAREHOLDERS A VOICE 9 (2010), available at http://brennan.3cdn.net
/54a676e481f019bfb8_bvm6ivakn.pdf (“[D]espite corporate managers’ attempts to
influence public policy through spending on elections, corporate political spending
correlates with lower shareholder value.” (citing Rajesh K. Aggarwal, Felix Meschke &
Tracy Wang, Corporate Political Contributions: Investment or Agency? (Apr. 2012)
(unpublished
manuscript),
available
at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=972670))); see also John C. Coates,
IV, Corporate Governance and Corporate Political Activity: What Effect Will Citizens United
Have on Shareholder Wealth?, HARVARD JOHN M. OLIN DISCUSSION PAPER SERIES NO. 684, at
16
(Sept.
21,
2010),
available
at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1680861## (discussing the negative
relationship between strong corporate governance and political spending, concluding
that firms that are more engaged in political activity result in lower profitability for
shareholders).
See, e.g., Delaware General Corporations Law §§ 122(17), 144 (2008); Model Business
Corporations Act §§ 8.30, 8.70 (2011).
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in Citizens United, leading to its position that the electioneering restriction at
issue was indeed constitutional. Arguably, the prevailing paradigm for
understanding a corporation is the economic or contractarian nexus of
contracts paradigm. As Part Two has shown, that paradigm focuses on the
bargains being struck between the constituents of a corporation in order to
assess whether regulation is constitutional and appropriate. Part Two has
attempted to outline more generally how the contractarian paradigm can
guide decisionmakers in assessing regulations.
The majority of the Court in Citizens United ignores this prevailing
336
contractarian theory as well as the state entity theory.
In doing so, the
majority arrives at the dangerous conclusion that corporations are entitled
to the same First Amendment protection in the area of campaign finance as
individuals. Had the majority considered the contractarian paradigm, it
would surely have arrived at a different conclusion.

III.

PART THREE: A CONTRACTARIAN ANALYSIS OF RESPONSES TO
CITIZENS UNITED

As we have seen in Parts One and Two, the majority in Citizens United
disregarded prevailing corporate law scholarship to overturn precedent and
find that corporations should have the same First Amendment free speech
rights as individuals, at least in the context of federal electioneering
regulations.
The contractarian paradigm is arguably the prevailing
paradigm used by scholars to understand corporate behavior and assess
corporate regulation. It is my argument that this contractarian paradigm
can and should be used to effectively assess when regulations are
constitutional and prudent.
This Part will use the contractarian paradigm discussed and developed in
Part Two to assess proposed responses to the Citizens United case. The most
dramatic response has been Senator Tom Udall’s call for a constitutional
337
amendment to effectively overturn Citizens United.
A constitutional
amendment, duly enacted, would be beyond reproach from the courts.
Aside from that dramatic proposal, however, there have been two other
significant proposals to attempt to redress the Citizens United case. Both of
these proposals involve regulatory responses. The first involves mandating
disclosure of all electioneering expenditures. The second demands specific
shareholder approval for any electioneering expenditures made by a

336

337

See Padfield, The Dodd-Frank Corporation, supra note 8, at 224; supra text accompanying
note 9 (describing examples of corporate theoretical scholarship, such as were
disregarded by the Citizens United majority).
See supra text accompanying note 34.
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corporation. Both of these responses will be discussed and assessed here in
accord with the contractarian paradigm described in Part Two.

A. Disclosure
In the aftermath of the Citizens United decision, many scholars and
commentators have advocated for a Securities and Exchange Commission
(“SEC”) regulation that would require corporations to disclose their political
contributions, with some exception for de minimis amounts. A group of ten
law professors who specialize in corporate law have petitioned the SEC to
338
effect just such a regulation (“SEC Disclosure Petition”).
In their
Disclosure Petition, those professors argue that there is a growing investor
appetite to know the details of corporate political spending, and that,
perhaps most importantly, such disclosure is necessary to ensure corporate
339
accountability.
In a follow-up letter to the SEC written in December 2011, the Brennan
Center for Justice at New York University School of Law wrote to support the
340
Disclosure Petition submitted by the law professors.
The Brennan Center
is a leading non-profit institute for policy analysis and focuses much of its
work on election law. “[T]he Brennan Center urges the Commission to use
its authority to bring transparency and accountability to corporate political
341
spending.”
Other scholars embrace the idea of more disclosure as an appropriate
342
legislative response to Citizens United.
Almost immediately following the
decision, Professor Tribe called for more disclosure of specifics regarding
343
who is funding particular electioneering communications. Professor Tribe
described such regulations as clearly within Congress’ power to regulate
344
interstate commerce.

338

339
340

341
342

343
344

Petition for Rulemaking from The Committee on Disclosure of Corporate Political
Spending to Elizabeth M. Murphy, Secretary of the Securities and Exchange Commission
(Aug. 3, 2011), available at http://sec.gov/rules/petitions/2011/petn4-637.pdf
[hereinafter “SEC Disclosure Petition”].
Id. at 2, 7–9.
Letter from J. Adam Skaggs, Senior Counsel to the Brennan Center for Justice, to
Elizabeth M. Murphy, Secretary of the Securities and Exchange Commission (Dec. 21,
2011), available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/4-637/4637-20.pdf.
Id. at 1.
See, e.g., John Coates & Taylor Lincoln, Fulfilling Kennedy’s Promise: Why the SEC Should
Mandate Disclosure of Corporate Political Activity, PUBLIC CITIZEN 10–11 (Sept. 2011)
(arguing that corporations that voluntarily make political disclosures actually showed
statistically higher market valuations).
Tribe, supra note 136.
Id.
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Moreover, the Supreme Court itself in the Citizens United case opined
that disclosure requirements regarding corporate political contributions
would likely be constitutional:
[P]rompt disclosure of expenditures can provide shareholders and
citizens with the information needed to hold corporations and elected
officials accountable for their positions and supporters. Shareholders can
determine whether their corporation’s political speech advances the
corporation’s interest in making profits, and citizens can see whether
345
elected officials are ‘in the pocket’ of so-called moneyed interests.

Eight of the nine Justices on the Supreme Court concurred on this part
346
of the Citizens United opinion.
Despite the strong support for this
disclosure regulation and even likely Supreme Court approval, the SEC has
not taken action to put a disclosure requirement into the rulemaking
347
pipeline.
From the contractarian paradigm, such a disclosure requirement is both
constitutional and prudent. Again, one of the benefits of using the
contractual analysis of a corporation is the insight gained from analyzing the
bargaining dynamics that exist between the corporation and its
348
constituents. Recommendations for appropriate regulation flow from that
analysis.
From a constitutional point of view, such a regulation would be within
the commerce power of Congress (here as delegated to the SEC). Further,
the injury to the right to liberty of contract of the parties would be overcome
by the rational basis for enacting the regulation, i.e. ensuring that investors
better understand what their corporate managers are doing with corporate
profits.
From a prudential point of view, the starting point for policymakers
again would be contractarian deference to the liberty of the parties to freely
contract for whatever they intend. Only where the bargain would be
infected by some defect would that deference shift in favor of regulation.
Where the regulation seeks to overcome some categorical infirmity in the
contracts under consideration, the regulation would be deemed prudent.
If corporate electioneering is allowed to proceed with no disclosure
requirement, then shareholders cannot adequately evaluate their bargain—
i.e. their decision to invest or to continue holding stock in any particular

345
346
347

348

Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 130 S. Ct. 876, 916 (2010) (internal citations
omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. at 886.
The SEC acknowledges receipt of the petition, and compared to other Petitions for
Rulemaking, there has been an extraordinary amount of additional comments received
in response.
See, e.g., Comments on Rulemaking Petition, SEC, available at
http://www.sec.gov/ comments/4-637/4-637.shtml (last visited Jan. 12, 2013).
Cf. Bainbridge, supra note 91, at 864–69.
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company. Indeed, a majority of the largest public companies in the United
349
States have actually begun to disclose their electioneering voluntarily.
Some critics of disclosure requirements argue that the marketplace will
achieve the optimal amount of disclosure that shareholders need and want
350
and that will not be overly burdensome or costly for corporations.
However, a requirement that corporations disclose their electioneering
would help shareholders of every public company understand the nature of
their investment decision. Disclosure generally aids parties in making a
bargain that is more fair, or might lead parties to avoid the bargain
altogether.
In this more specific example involving disclosure of political
contributions, the same logic applies. More disclosure should lead to a
fairer bargain. Conversely, the ability of a corporation to hide its political
contributions leads to a potentially unfair bargain with investors. Investors
could become unwitting contributors to candidates they do not support.

B. Shareholder Approval
Another possible regulatory response to the Citizens United decision is to
require specific shareholder approval of corporate electioneering
351
expenditures before they happen.
This approach was actually put into
352
place in England in 2000 as an amendment to the British Companies Act.
The amendment was enacted in response to the perception that corporate
money was being used to buy influence. The amendment was an attempt to
353
create more transparency and accountability at the corporate level.
The exact details of such a plan are beyond the scope of this Article.
However, as an example, corporations could be required to get shareholder
approval to spend up to a certain fixed amount on political donations
349

350

351
352

353

See, e.g., TORRES-SPELLISCY, supra note 334, at 21 (“At the very least, Congress should
require corporations to disclose their political spending, as many top firms have already
volunteered to do.”).
See Nancy J. Whitmore, Facing the Fear: A Free Market Approach for Economic Expression, 17
COMM. L. & POL’Y 21, 24–29 (2012) (arguing that in order “[t]o properly function, public
discussion must exist in an open, self-regulating marketplace”).
For an excellent overview of this suggestion, see TORRES-SPELLISCY, supra note 334, at 16–
20 (analyzing a British law that has implemented shareholder approval requirements).
Political Parties, Elections and Referendums Act, 2000, at c. 41, § 50 (Eng.), available at
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2000/41/contents; see also Bebchuk & Jackson,
supra note 244, at 98–99 (discussing the British law requiring shareholder consent for
political spending in excess of £5000).
See TORRES-SPELLISCY, supra note 334, at 16 (discussing the problem of corporate money
in politics in the United Kingdom before the enactment of the shareholder approval
amendment, and quoting Lord Neill, who chaired the Committee on Standards in Public
Life as saying the reform was needed “to bring the United Kingdom into line with best
practice in other mature democracies”).
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generally. Alternatively, corporations might be required to get approval for
each specific donation, specifying amount and recipient. Regardless of how
such a proposal is crafted in the United States, the basic idea of requiring
shareholder approval for corporate political donations can also be evaluated
in accord with the contractarian nexus of contracts paradigm.
Once again, the constitutional analysis is fairly simple to satisfy.
Congress or the SEC would surely have power to enact such a regulation on
the basis of the Commerce Clause. Moreover, any rational basis for the
statute will satisfy any issues with interference in any liberty of contract
interest. Here, the rational basis for the regulation—investor protection—is
surely sufficient to uphold the regulation against a constitutional challenge.
The prudential analysis of the policy is more difficult but is aided by
using the contractarian paradigm. The starting point for the contractarian
is a default position that would defer to the liberty of contract of the parties
and would prefer that no regulation interfere with that liberty of contract.
But again, if there is some defect in the set of bargains under consideration,
then the default position would shift and would support regulation that is
appropriately tailored to address the defect.
When considering this proposal for shareholder approval of political
contributions, the defect present in the class of contracts under
consideration is the same defect discussed above in connection with the
disclosure proposal. If corporations are allowed to electioneer in an
unregulated and undisclosed way, then the resulting bargain with the
shareholder can be viewed as defective. It might involve unconscionability,
on the basis of the unfairness present. It might involve a lack of good faith
on that same basis. It might involve misrepresentation on the basis that the
shareholder would not and should not expect any profits to be routed into
politics without shareholder consent.
Shareholders make their investment bargain in order to maximize
profits, not to support or oppose candidates for office. Unregulated and
unbridled electioneering spending of corporate funds has no illustrated
354
positive correlation with profitability.
Further, corporate support for any
particular candidate is likely to run counter to the political preferences of
many shareholders. Without the ability to approve political spending (or
even to know the extent of it) shareholders enter into a bargain with
unforeseen consequences, consequences that may indeed be opposed to the
general reason the bargain was made in the first place: maximizing profits.
In his testimony before a congressional subcommittee immediately after
Citizens United was decided, Professor John Coffee spoke to the notion that
corporate political spending is often said to be in the best interest of
354

See supra text accompanying note 309.
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shareholders. To the contrary, he states that “the interests of shareholders
and managers do not appear to be well aligned with respect to political
355
Coffee cites to the Center for Political Accountability,
contributions.”
which he explains has found that corporations often fund “political causes
356
or issues having no obvious relationship to their corporation’s interests.”
The shareholder approval proposal goes directly to solving this
contracting problem. In this case, the proposal corrects the defects present
in allowing unchecked spending by ensuring shareholder approval of the
political support.
One complication of this scheme comes from a legal realist perspective.
Critics of corporate democracy often claim that shareholders, especially
individual shareholders, are rationally detached from participation in any
357
aspects of corporate governance. Most individual shareholders throw away
their proxy materials and never cast their vote even when it comes to
358
electing a board of directors.
Moreover, for many shareholders,
ownership in a corporation is indirect. Their shares are held in a mutual
fund or some other investment vehicle and managed by institutional
359
managers.
If individual shareholders opt out of voting to approve or disapprove
political spending, then they do so implicitly accepting either outcome. It is
less likely that institutional managers will opt out of approving or
disapproving political spending. Instead, such institutional shareholders will
be incentivized by their own desire for profits to push corporate managers to
show that the political spending contemplated will help the corporation
improve profitability. As Professor Coffee stated, “[I]t is hardly radical to
360
urge that [shareholders] be given a say in how [their corporation] is run.”

355

356

357

358
359
360

Corporate Governance After Citizens United: Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Capital
Markets, Insurance, and Government Sponsored Enterprises of the United States H. Comm. on
Financial Services, 111th Cong. 51 (2010) (statement of John C. Coffee, Jr., Adolf A. Berle
Professor of Law, Columbia Law School).
Id. (citing CENTER FOR POLITICAL ACCOUNTABILITY, HIDDEN RIVERS: HOW TRADE
ASSOCIATIONS CONCEAL CORPORATE POLITICAL SPENDING, ITS THREAT TO COMPANIES, AND
WHAT SHAREHOLDERS CAN DO (2006)).
See Michael K. Molitor, The Crucial Role of the Nominating Committee: Re-Inventing
Nominating Committees in the Aftermath of Shareholder Access to the Proxy, 11 U.C. DAVIS BUS.
L.J. 97, 136–38 (2010) (“[T]he ‘typical’ shareholder in a public corporation is said to be
rationally apathetic.”).
Id. at 138 (describing shareholder “apathy” that leads to “very little incentive to nominate
directors”).
Id. (noting that in recent decates there has been a “rise of ‘institutional’ shareholders,
particularly mutual funds”).
See Corporate Governance After Citizens United: Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Capital
Markets, Insurance, and Government Sponsored Enterprises of the United States H. Comm. on
Financial Services, 111th Cong. 64 (2010) (statement of John C. Coffee, Jr., Adolf A. Berle
Professor of Law, Columbia Law School).
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Professor Larry Ribstein has argued that regulatory efforts designed to
improve shareholder rights may ultimately protect some shareholders at the
361
cost of harming others. Professor Ribstein concludes that on balance, the
public might indeed be better off without the imposition of incoherent
362
regulations.
Despite these criticisms, under a contractarian perspective the
shareholder approval mechanism would certainly be constitutional, despite
impinging on the parties’ freedom of contract, and would likely be prudent
as well. Again, the mechanism is designed to allow shareholders to know
what they are getting from their investment bargain and to prevent
unfairness from infecting that bargain.

CONCLUSION
In this Article, I have argued that the contractarian view of a corporation
is not only helpful in analyzing the constitutionality of any corporation
regulation, but also instructive when assessing the prudence of any such
proposed regulation. Contractarians typically assert that individuals should
be allowed the liberty of contract to design their own transactions and that
government should avoid mandatory regulatory action. However, it is my
thesis that because so many of those contracts as a class are flawed,
regulation designed to correct those flaws is not only constitutional, but also
appropriate. I use contracts generally here to indicate that my thesis has
broad application to any set of transactions that could be said to have flawed
contracts at their core—from shareholders purchasing stock to consumers
agreeing to credit card terms. I set forth this contractarian framework for
analysis in Part Two and then used it to assess the Citizens United decision
itself and, in Part Three, two of the more widely proposed regulatory
responses to the Citizens United decision. In all three cases, because the
bargain shareholders are making does not include the prospect of a
corporation giving corporate funds away in an unregulated and unbridled
way, regulation in this area serves to protect the interests of the shareholders
in their bargain. Regulation of election spending is all the more justified in
this case because the very nature of our democratic system is at stake.
361

362

Larry E. Ribstein, The First Amendment and Corporate Governance, 27 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 1019,
1043 (2011) (arguing that “protecting the expressive rights of some shareholders may
infringe the expression of other stakeholders and unacceptably restrict corporate
speech”).
Id. at 1043–44 (advocating that “in determining the constitutionality of governance
regulation, courts must weigh protection of shareholder expression against frustrating
corporate speech generally and the expression rights of particular shareholders and
stakeholders” but concluding that “[t]he proposed . . . burden on corporate speech is
likely to be too great even without this balancing”).
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Citizens United has spawned a flood of interest in the effect corporate
money has on politics in the United States. Moreover, the majority’s
opinion was the subject of a scathing dissent, and criticisms from both of the
other branches of our government. President Obama rebuked the Justices
in the majority. A group of senators has proposed a constitutional
amendment to undo the opinion.
While the lack of corporate disclosure of political spending makes it
difficult to assess the effect the decision is actually having in our political
system, statistics show that corporate political spending has grown
exponentially and, at least in the gubernatorial elections, the money is going
363
to Republicans three times as often as it is to Democrats.
The majority opinion in Citizens United spoke of safeguarding a
fundamental principle of our Constitution, the First Amendment, to support
its decision. However, it failed to consider any of the prevailing corporate
law scholarship when making its ruling. The most widely accepted paradigm
for understanding a corporation characterizes a corporation as nothing
more than a nexus of contracts. That paradigm would focus on the rights of
the various constituents of a corporation rather than rights the corporation
itself might possess. The contractarian paradigm recognizes the fiction of
corporate personhood and limits that fiction by putting it in service to the
corporation’s constituents.
The Citizens United opinion is complex, just as its implications are.
However, sometimes it is helpful to see how simple complex issues can
actually be. Ben and Jerry, the corporate owners of the ice cream company,
were speaking to a convocation recently and left the audience with this
observation:
“‘I’m Ben,’ began Ben & Jerry’s founder Ben Cohen. ‘I’m a person.’
‘I’m Jerry,’ continued his partner, Jerry Greenfield. ‘I’m a person.’
‘Ben & Jerry’s Ice Cream, Inc. . . ’ proceeded Cohen,

363

Ciara Torres-Spelliscy, The $500 Million Question: Are the Democratic And Republican
Governors Associations Really State PACs Under Buckley’s Major Purpose Test?, 15 N.Y.U. J.
LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 485, 502 (2012) (citing statistics showing that in 2010, the
Republican Governors Association had raised and spent approximately three times as
much as the Democratic Governors Association); see also ANNE KIM, A THUMB ON THE
SCALES: OUTSIDE SPENDING IN 2010 SENATE RACES 3 (Feb. 2012), available at
http://progressivepolicy.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/02/2.2012-Kim_A-Thumb-onthe-Scales_Outside-Spending-in-2010-Senate-Races.pdf (describing the relative spending
by conservative and liberal groups in the 2010 Senate elections); Stephanie Ferrell et al.,
Super PAC spending, L.A. TIMES (Feb. 16, 2012), http://graphics.latimes.com/2012election-superpac-spending/ (depicting in graphical manner the amount spent by PACs
supporting the various candidates for president in 2012).
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‘. . . is not a person,’ finished Greenfield, to laughter and applause.”
The contractarian paradigm should empower both judicial and
legislative bodies to appropriately regulate and even limit the activities of
corporations. It is my hope that this Article might encourage jurists and
legislators to do just that.
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Carl Etnier, Montpelier Citizens United forum draws standing-room crowd, VTDIGGER.ORG
(Nov. 30, 2011), http://vtdigger.org/2011/11/30/montpelier-citizens-united-forumdraws-standing-room-crowd/.

